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Images of Men in Feminist Legal Theory
Brian Bendig"
I. INTRODUCTION
"Few discoveries are more irritating than those which expose the pedigree of
ideas."
-Lord Acton
This essay displays the importance of images of men, male, and mascu-
line in ferinist legal theory. As a group, the feminist jurisprudes dis-
cussed herein use such images in two different ways. In some texts, the
images or depictions are deployed to help generate the plausibility and
strength of the articles' main themes. In other texts, the images are actu-
ally formative of the main themes, even to the degree of comprising
them. My term for these significant feminist data on men, male, and
masculine is "andric imagery."
This essay is not a catalogue of references to men in feminist legal
theory, nor does it elaborate on the prosaic idea that a gender-focused
jurisprudence incorporates representations of the genders. Rather, the
essay shows that andric imagery is an important resource in feminist
legal theory by demonstrating the crucial roles played by such images in
feminist jurisprudential texts. It displays the yield from a persistent focus
on feminist jurisprudes' images of what men are and what male and
masculine mean. The paper discusses selections from the work of such
theorists as Marie Ashe, Robin West, Catharine MacKinnon, Fran Olsen,
Kenneth Karst, and Suzanna Sherry.
II. MARIE ASHE
As a major theme of her work, Marie Ashe argues that birth mothers
have the greatest claim to decision-making authority in childbearing. This
theme is built upon two andric images in her writings: (1) negative imag-
* Associate, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Illinois. J.D. cum laude, Harvard Law
School (1992). I wish to thank Duncan Kennedy and Andrew Jacobs, who provided
helpful and insightful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
ery of a male medico-legal discourse and (2) an image of men as bodies
outside the possibility of sharing authority in childbearing. The discus-
sion below features three articles by Ashe: Law-Language of Maternity:
Discourse Holding Nature in Contempt,' Conversation and Abortion: A
Review of Abortion and Divorce in Western Law by Mary Ann
Glendon,2 and Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on
'Reproduction" and the Law.'
A. The Image of Male Medico-Legality
Ashe's writings on maternity contain a crucial andric image. This im-
age-a male medico-legal discourse that is distinct from women's knowl-
edge and practices of maternity-is central to her argument that birth
mothers have the greatest claim to authority regarding all aspects of
reproduction.
Ashe views law and medicine as a discourse-practices complex. She
sometimes melds and hyphenates them:
The "ordinary" medico-legal regulations of pregnancy and birthing (restricting
time, place and manner of conducting pregnancy and of giving birth) are so perva-
sive that we often fail to recognize them as in fact regulations-particular cultural
variants, perhaps, of a general and universal regulation of female sexuality and
female personhood.4
She also refers to law and medicine as distinct, but functionally related.
For example, she states: "[Elven when law has recognized some limited
freedom of choice and action for women, relating to the most intimate of
bodily functions, it has circumscribed that choice by giving great weight
to medical experts' participation in the reproductive decision of the preg-
nant woman."'
1. Marie Ashe, Law-Language of Maternity: Discourse Holding Nature in Con-
tempt, 22 NEw ENG. L REv. 521 (1988).
2. Marie Ashe, Conversation and Abortion: A Review of Abortion and Divorce in
Western Law by Mary Ann Glendon, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 387 (1987).
3. Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on Reproduction
and the Law, 13 NOvA L. REv. 355 (1989).
4. Ashe, supra note 3, at 371 (footnote omitted).
5. Ashe, supra note 1, at 542. The following quotations provide a further sample of
Ashe's melding of "law* and "medicine" in a discourse-practices complex:
The pressures against birthing at home, in the sites where our mothers and
grandmothers birthed, are enormous. Friends and family so take for granted
the definitions of pregnancy and birthing articulated by medicine and en-
forced by law that they are unable to understand the choice of home-birth
except as a kind of recklessness .... [O]peration of law demonstrates the
legal buttressing of the strictest forms of medical regulation. It precludes
women's defining the degree to which we will treat our pregnancies and
birthings as medical constructs.
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The goal here is to demonstrate Ashe's ascription of maleness to the
medico-legal discourse. First, her disassociation of the medico-legal dis-
course from women is discussed. Second, Ashe's conceptualization of the
medico-legal discourse as male is displayed.
1. The Disjunction of Women and the Medico-Legal Discourse
According to Ashe, law and medicine are antithetical to the speech of
women's bodies. For example, "'the body language' characteristic of
women's writing cannot easily be transposed into a public discourse in
which the ostensibly neutral terminologies of science and medicine pre-
vail."' This also applies to law because, "[c]ommitted to categorization,
law is intolerant of porous boundaries (placentas?)."7
The medico-legal discourse is harmful as well as alien. Medico-legal
concepts and practices constitute deleterious authority: "In what are
particularly shocking cases emphasizing the medical model of separabili-
ty and the adversarial status of mother and fetus, courts have ordered
the most violent technological intrusions into female bodies-Caesarian
sections-in the name of fetal protection in contradiction of the mother's
judgment against such surgery."' Ashe explicitly locates this harm in the
alien discourse: "These cases ... perpetrate a violence to the
personhoods of all women-mothers and non-mothers-by reliance on a
discourse infinitely removed from and greatly at odds with the accounts
that women might give of our own encounters with the potentialities and
actualities of pregnancy and childbirth.""
Lastly, harm is specifically conjoined with the opposition of the exter-
nal discourse and birthing women's self-accounts rooted in nature. Ad-
dressing women, she bemoans the fact that "[r]egulation and definition
Ashe, supra note 3, at 365. "The infusion of medical metaphor into law-language has
been apparent. in the law's treatment of many issues involving pregnancy and child-
birth." Ashe, supra note 1, at 541.
6. Marie Ashe, Mind's Opportunity: Birthing a Poststructuralist Feminist Juris-
prudence, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1129, 1151 (1987).
7. Ashe, supra note 3, at 366. Any overlap between the discourses is fortuitous:
"While [the medical] model may correspond to some primary experiences of pregnan-
cy-most typically to experiences. of undesired pregnancy or to the experiences of
ambivalence which occur in the course of desired pregnancy-it by no means fully
defines female experience." Ashe, supra note 1, at 540.
8. Ashe, supra note 1, at 542 (footnote omitted).
9. Id. at 543 (footnote omitted).
have always already assessed our work and our nature."'0 In the area of
surrogacy, "the uncertain constructs of man-made law" should not be
substituted for birth mothers' knowledge based on "the seamless bonds
of nature."" Harm results from medico-legal interference with a natural
sphere that is beyond the language of law or medicine. Ashe defines this
sphere as follows:
The identity of the mother and child is pre-verbal: the child will have no words for
it, and the words of the mother will always be tentative, inadequate .... That fu-
sion or identity can be said to constitute a prolonged embodiment of a kind of
immediate, trans-verbal knowledge, an experience that is definitionally unspeak-
able for the reason that it lies outside of, or escapes from, the boundaries of lan-
guage .... Writers have noted that women speaking of their maternity experienc-
es are able to define and describe their negative experiences, but that they seem
unable to elaborate or articulate fully what was "wonderful." The reason for this
silence likely resides in the impossibility of expressing a pre-verbal, pre-cultural,
natural, prenatal bond."
2. The Maleness of the Medico-Legal Discourse
Beyond disassociating the discourse from women, Ashe identifies the
medico-legal discourse with men. First, men are its originators and servi-
tors. They are the agents of their discourse. Second, the discourse is the
speech of men's bodies. Ashe actually gives it a male anatomy; she ren-
ders it "andromorphically." The discourse would seem to be the speech
of the wrong bodies, according to Ashe.
Ashe continually associates men with the discourse. For example, they
are the source of its harm: "It has seemed to me that the major attributes
of legal discourse concerning women and mothers are these: it originates
in men; it defines women with certainty; it attempts to mask the opera-
tions of power; it silences other discourse."3 The discourse does more
than originate in men; it takes the form of scripture, with men as a
technics-serving clergy:
10. Ashe, supra note 3, at 357.
11. Ashe, supra note 1, at 559.
12. Ashe, supra note 1, at 551 (footnote omitted). As another example:
If, for medicine, the female body is a machine, it is for all women (and per-
haps for all people, in our deepest experience) the locus of nature, the site
of powerful, undifferentiated or contradictory forces which underlie culture.
As culture defines itself against nature, female self-naming entails a confronta-
tion with the operation of nature through the female body.
Id, at 544 (footnote omitted).
13. Ashe, supra note 3, at 358 (footnote omitted). The origin of the male discourse
is phrased differently in the following quotation: "The current public discourse re-
garding [menstruation, pregnancy, abortion, childbirth, lactation, and the suffering of
rape] has been dominated by male perspectives and male definitions." Ashe, supra note
2, at 387.
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There was a time when the shedding of women's blood-in childbirth, in menstru-
ation, and, it may be, in abortion-was accompanied by elaborate ritual. Such
ritual constructed and expressed the experience of the sacred generally attached
to the open shedding of blood. The medicalization of abortion-like that of child-
birth and pregnancy-has set women at a distance from the blood ceremonies of
our bodies, placing us at the mercy of a technological priesthood that denies the
sacred, detaching us from the physicality and the cultural implications of violence
and bloodshed. We have become the victims, and not the agents, of bloodshed."4
Medicine and law have combined to legitimate a male-staffed regime
that has usurped the rightful rule of the mother. Ashe traces women's
loss of control over birthing to the invention of tools to be inserted into
the vagina and the ascendancy of the inventor/users of those tools:
Historians generally locate the emergence of medical control over birth in the
invention of the forceps and the ascendancy of forceps-users in the sixteenth
century. That invention and usage marked a departure from female control of
birth and a movement placing its control in the hands of male *medical ex-
perts."
s
This regime is a coordinated, closed system-a discourse-practices
complex that holds nature in contempt by denying and intruding upon it:
"The practice has been defined as one emphasizing ever-increasing appli-
cations of machinery and technology to the female body. And medical
theory-its discourse-has been defred as giving an account of the fe-
male body itself in mechanical terms.""
Having established and legitimated itself, medico-legality relies on the
andric minions of medicalized birth to work its destructive power.'7
Ashe uses male doctors to anecdotally represent sinister discursive im-
peratives. In strong contrast to the care and empathy of a midwife, a
male doctor effects medicine's dehumanization of the maternal body,
14. Ashe, supra note 3, at 377.
15. Ashe, supra note 1, at 538 (footnote omitted).
16. 1d.
17. Ashe feels that women can abjure victimhood and reclaim agency only by cir-
cumventing medico-legality, as is clear from her descriptions of her homebirthings:
Each birth was attended by a friend who had herself birthed at home. Each
was without formal medical training. They extended care which I had never
received in a hospital .... Each of them was extremely intelligent, very
well-informed, caring, and understanding of women's needs for dignity and re-
spect. The births were unqualifiediy joyous occasions.
Ashe, supra note 3, at 365. "Encouraged by a plurality of female voices; kindness of
hands that touched when I needed touching, that otherwise left me alone; understand-
ing and courage communicated through eyes familiar with the extremities of birthing."
Id. at 370.
referring to the flesh surrounding the birth canal as "a sterile area.""
After an illegal home birth, Ashe describes an encounter with her male
pediatrician: "The pediatrician came out to see [the newborn]. He looks
great, he said. I don't want to pry at all, he said, but I wonder who was
with you during the birth? I know your husband was there. But was
someone else with you? I gave him no names."'"
Ashe also identifies men with the medico-legal discourse through her
"andromorphic" description of the discourse. Various components of the
discourse are rendered as analogies from male-specific physicality. For
example, she views medico-legality's concept of the division between
gestating mother and fetus as discursive borrowing from male reproduc-
tive biology: "The emphases on separability and discontinuity [in medico-
legality] operate to obscure precisely those features of female reproduc-
tion which differentiate its process most clearly from that of the male re-
productive experience."'
Medico-legality is also rendered as an abstraction from certain male
bodies. For example, law is analogized to the penis of the rapist: "Law
reaches every silent space. It invades the secrecy of women's wombs. It
breaks every silence, uttering itself. Law-language, juris-diction. It de-
fines. It commands. It forces."2
In one series of passages that links rape to the interaction between
discourse and practice in medico-legality, Ashe describes the post-birth
removal of her placenta by a doctor in a clinic:
I push his hand away. He is pressirg something steel inside me. Please stop, I beg
him. He doesn't answer. He drives the steel object in more deeply. His face is
covered like hers. Then he speaks: we have to do this. I beg him to stop.'
She continues her description of this ordeal, repeating the doctor's ex-
planation of medical justification:
Someone is speaking. There is no woman here. There are no women in here. That
one behind the mask is not like you. I hear horrible laughter. I push the mask
away and I scream .... And they stop. He pulls out his tools and drops them
onto the counter. They clang .... He slips the mask down .... WE HAD TO DO
IT, HE SAYS.-
She concludes by giving the experience a resonant name: "[A] friend
came by .... I told her my story. He raped you, she said. I hated those
18. Id at 360. Ashe describes her own powerlessness during a hospital birth under
the command of a male forceps-user "'Damn it,' he said, 'she's not pushing hard
enough. Get me a forceps.'" Id,
19. Id. at 367.
20. Ashe, supra note 1, at 541.
21. Ashe, supra note 3, at 355.
22. Id. at 368.
23. Id. at 369 (emphasis added).
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words. I did not want to hear them. Or to say them. But they were true.
He raped me."'
B. The Image of Men as Nonauthoritative Bodies
Unsurprisingly, Ashe argues that women's voices need to be heard in
the public debate surrounding issues of maternity.Y As is apparent from
the discussion thus far, Ashe goes further, asserting the salutary primacy
women should have in decision-making over childbearing. This brief
section will demonstrate that Ashe also builds this claim to women's
desirable trumping role in reproduction on a notion of bodily-based au-
thority, which gathers considerable force from an andric image located in
Ashe's writings on maternity: an image of men as bodies who do not
have women's bodily-based authority.
1. The Authority of Women and the Body Image of Men
Ashe asserts that, ultimately, women should be the sole authorities
over birthing, alone in private spheres: "I want a law that will let us
be-women. That, recognizing the violence inherent in every regulation
of female 'reproduction,' defines an area of non-regulation, within which
we will make, each of us, our own 'mortal decisions.'"'
For Ashe, women's authority within the issues of childbearing is cen-
tered on the knowledge derived from experiences rooted in their bodies.
In other words, women have a body-derived phenomenology of authority.
For example, birth mothers' body experiences are the trump in surrogacy
disputes: "[T]he singular bodily contribution of 'gestation' and the effect
of that gestation upon her personhood, establishes the absolute primacy
of the birthing mother's claim to a continuous relationship with the child
of her body."'
24. Id, at 370.
25. On at least one issue, they need to be heard exclusively: "On the issue of abor-
tion, I urge that, at this time in our history, it is essential that women speak-to
ourselves and of ourselves-and that men should, for the time being, listen very
carefully and say very little." Ashe, supra note 2, at 400-01.
26. Ashe, supra note 3, at 383.
27. Ashe, supra note 1, at 546-47. The following quotations show the body-locus of
women's uttered truths in Ashe's writings:
The self-accounts of mothers and of all women-pregnant, birthing, aborting,
suffering violations or growing in power-constitute utterances closer to the
reality of women's experiences than does any formulation of law and medi-
Unstated, but glaringly obvious, is a concomitant image of men as lack-
ing this knowledge and authority because no man has a maternal body.'
Ashe considers some women to have more authority than others. For
example, in surrogacy disputes, the birth mother should have primacy
over the egg donor.' A logical corollary of her claim to a body-
phenomenology of reproductive authority for women who achieve gesta-
tion is the notion that all men are merely bodies that do not develop this
authority.
3
'
The claim here is that, despite her careful effort to locate the case for
women's decision-making primacy in the female bodily experience of
childbearing, Ashe also implicitly locates it in an andric image. Her texts
portray men as male bodies that do not share authority over reproduc-
tion by locating the source of this authority in the maternal body. Her
construct of authority as body-derived is neither logically nor
representationally complete apart from this image. Her andric image is
the mirror-reflective doppelgdnger of her body-phenomenology of mater-
nal authority.
The few passages in her work that generalize about male parenting
echo this image. Thus, "after the act of 'sperm donation,' however ac-
complished, [men] experience neither the continuous bodily process
constituting the development of a human child nor the bodily identity
with that child."' Also, men, unlike women, do not seem to relate to
their bodies in important ways at all: "[O]ur public policy must move
beyond its ordinary frame of reference to an understanding of the nature
of the bodily experiences and related self-definitions that constitute, FOR
WOMEN, our personhoods."'
cine. While our generalizations and extrapolations from those experiences
may be in conflict, when we attend to one another we discover truths that,
rising out of our natural and acculturated bodies, do not conflict.
Ashe, supra note 3, at 382. Ashe contends that "It]he task, then, of women-mothers
and of women-non-mothers oppressed by law becomes that of speaking clearly of the
experiences grounded in our own bodies." Ashe, supra note 1, at 544. FInally, Ashe
posits that "[t]he gift of feminism to structuralism, already apparent in Kristeva's work,
is the gift of voices asserting the truth-claims of female bodies." Ashe, supra note 6, at
1172.
28. This theme is rendered as a set of experiences in the following quotation:
"There is a set of experiences that is unique to women because the female body is its
site. That set includes menstruation, pregnancy, abortion, childbirth, lactation, and the
suffering of rape." Ashe, supra note 2, at 387.
29. Ashe, supra note 1, at 547.
30. Ashe could be described as imaging non-birthing women as their bodies. This is
consistent with her constructs of birthing women and men. See id.
31. Ashe, supra note 1, at 541.
32. Id at 556 (emphasis added).
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C. Conclusion
Ashe has based her account of authority in birthing on andric imagery.
However, Ashe's main andric image-her elaborate construct of a male
medico-legal discourse-is rich, unlike her second, derivative image of
men as inhabiting bodies that do not develop reproductive authority.
Still, the relationship between andric imagery ana Ashe's theme of
women's reproductive primacy is readily apparent in both parts of her
argument. Her andric imagery is rich when she is on the attack,
critiquing "male" knowledge, institutions, and practices. When directly
valorizing birth mothers, her andric imagery is oblique, and almost silent.
Two problems attend Ashe's male discourse image. First, her ascrip-
tion of maleness to medico-legality textually relies on a metaphorical
opposition in which men are aligned with artificiality (discourse and its
literal tools') and women with nature. This seems to define the non-wom-
an human as out of "nature."
Second, to the extent that Ashe renders the discourse as analogous to
certain elements of "maleness," her critique falls into what might be
termed the anthropomorphic fallacy. Ashe's "andromorphism" is subject
to the charge that is levelled at anthropomorphic constructs in general:
they project unexamined assumptions of what is human into non-human
spheres. The fallacy lies in basing a definition of something non-human
on such unexplored assumptions. Ashe, for her part, has projected her
own assumptions about the non-woman human onto the medico-legal
discourse. These assumptions, moreover, are not explained or acknowl-
edged. She merely asserts them without comment or qualification.
Briefly, there are several problems with the second image, her repre-
sentation of men as inhabiting bodies that do not share authority over
reproduction. First, her body-being construct is unverifiable, if not
oversimplistic. Ashe does not trace the path from body to identity; her
thesis is ipse dixit. Second, she commonalizes and stereotypes. Her the-
sis of birth mothers' authority follows from her so.le grant of unassailable
reproductive knowledge to all birth mothers.
Third, her privileging of birth mothers in the entire range of choosers
surrounding human reproduction may rest on a selective, aureate vision
of birth mothers. For example, the nonauthoritative-body image of men
exists in contrast to Ashe's profoundly positive view of gestational moth-
erhood. The following passage demonstrates her grandly affirmative view
of the meaning of birth mothers:
Any abrupt or premature rupture of the connection to the maternal body must
constitute for the child a non-gentle second bodily birth; an occasion of suffering;
a particular wound. While the child experiencing that rupture may be offered, and
may accept, alternative nurturance, comfort and sustenance, he will still have lost
an irreplaceable relationship. There is a singular and indefensible deprivation
involved in removing the child from occasions of infantile pleasure, in denying
him the consolation he might later experience in remembrance of that pleasure.'
One suspects that Ashe's views of birth mothers' identities and authori-
ty might also rest very heavily on extrapolation from her own experienc-
es. In the words of Joan Williams: "[Ashe] has chosen to make the expe-
riences of pregnancy and birthing central to her adult identity (not only
has she experienced eight pregnancies, she also writes extensively about
maternity)."'
III. KENNETH KARST
Not everyone would call Kenneth Karst a "feminist theorist." Karst
himself has disclaimed such status. For example, when setting out to
inquire into the transformative constitutional possibilities of women's
greater participation in American lawmaking, he wrote: "The inquiry...
is not a search for a model constitution, for a society organized around
the network of connection,... a project on that order is one for a femi-
nist theorist."'
It is clear, however, that some of Karst's pieces heavily feature the
theme of examining and ending women's subordination. Further, these
themes are grounded in andric images embedded in these texts. Karst, if
not a full-fledged feminist jurisprude, is at least a legal theorist whose
work, in part, confronts women's subordination and incorporates foun-
dational andric images.'
As is obvious from its title, andric imagery forms the thematics of his
recent article, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the
Armed Forces." Karst's thesis is that certain military policies, such as
the exclusion of women from combat, are the result of segregationist
33. Id. at 553 (citing J. KniSTEvA, TALES OF LOVE 235, 248-53 (L. Roudiez trans.,
1987).
34. Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern
Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE LJ. 296,
322 n.122.
35. Kenneth L Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE LJ. 447, 480.
36. Karst's disclaimer implicates key questions present in contemporary feminism,
such as (1) what is a feminist? and (2) who can be a feminist?
37. Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed
Forces, 38 U.C.L.A. L REV. 499 (1991).
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concerns furthered by "the pursuit of manhood.' A full analysis of The
Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces is not
included in this essay because its formative andric imagery is acknowl-
edged-even trumpeted-as such.' The article is a rata avis, a jurispru-
dential text that explicitly recognizes its foundational andric imagery.
This section will concentrate on another of Karst's articles, Woman's
Constitution.' The theme advanced in this article, that of a possible or
plausible "woman's constitution," derives from a complex, ulterior, and
general andric image. The foundational andric image in Woman's Consti-
tution has to be collected from several places in the text before it be-
comes coherent and clear.
A. Andrc Imagery Supporting a 'Woman's Constitution"
Karst's main theme in Woman's Constitution is exploring an answer to
the following general question: "What might be the consequences if our
constitutional law itself were reconstructed to add a healthy measure of
the morality and world view characteristic of our society's female
half?"' Karst's answer is that there would indeed be nontrivial conse-
quences. This answer is undergirded by textual passages that constitute
an elaboration of Karst's own honest admission at the outset that he
"assumes that there are differences in the ways in which women and
men tend to see the world.
Given his candid avowal of basic gender differences, it is unsurprising
that a bifurcated scheme of gendered traits is present throughout Karst's
discussion of the gender-based transformability of our constitutional
ethos. However, Karst's focus is on women; much of his article is a
Gilliganesque discussion of women's separate moral sphere.' His
38. 1& at 500.
39. See iAL at 502-10, 523-45. Karst's article is a collection of characterizations of
men, male, and masculinity. The main, shepherding image is of male group wall-
building in the service of the anxieties brought on by "the pursuit of manhood." See,
e.g., id, at 503-04. A few lines from Bertolt Brecht's satire of military masculinity, A
Man's a Man, summarize this image:
The keynote now is relativity.
And left is right, and right is mostly wrong.
When he's a she, what will become of me?
40. Karst, supra note 35, at 447.
41. 1l at 449.
42. Id. at 480.
43. Karst terms Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and
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Gilliganian image of women is a main structural element of Woman's
Constitution. The purpose here is to briefly display the emphasis he also
places on a disaggregated generalization of men, a structural element
that is much less obvious from Karst's comments on his own text.
In Woman's Constitution, Karst's image of men is of their conscious-
ness-bounded self-dealing. Men are portrayed as crucially oblivious, with
an onanism rooted in male epistemics. For example, male-dominated leg-
islatures are described as follows:
When a male-dominated legislature considers an issue that touches the interests
of women-abortion, for example-it would be extraordinary if the legislators
were to think consciously about the origins of their own personal definitions of
woman, and to find the ability to exclude those definitions from the process of
legislative decision-maing .... The point is that a group of men, in deciding.
issues that define women's roles, cannot help being influenced by the traditional
construct of woman."
This male obliviousness is explicitly paired with self-dealing:
Citizenship is a form of power, including the power to influence matters that are
personal. The point can be illustrated by a short flight of fancy. Suppose that
men-men as we know them, with their present political dominance and with
their attitudes toward interpersonal relationships-were, by some miracle, trans-
formed so that they, rather than women, were the ones who became pregnant and
bore children. Can anyone doubt that "abortions on demand" would be the gov-
erning rile of law?"
Male epistemology--chiefly the idea of autonomy-is implicated in
closely-bounded consciousness. For example:
Women's Development an "especially valuable work" within the literature exploring
women's "difference." Id. at 481 (citing CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHO-
LOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982)). Karst acknowledges that Gilligan's
"interpretation has the ring of truth." Id.
44. Karst, supra note 35, at 468. Karst has offered this image in the judicial context
as well, when discussing the pre-O'Connor Supreme Court:
[Tihe constitutional sport of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), and last
Term's even sillier statutory counterpart, General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976), with their Alice-in-Wonderland view of pregnancy as a sex-
neutral phenomenon, are good candidates for early retirement. These deci-
sions are textbook examples of the effects of underrepresentation on "leg-
islative" insensitivity. Imagine what the presence of even one woman Justice
would have meant to the Court's conferences.
Kenneth L Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Forward: Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 H-Lv. L REV. 1, 54 n.304 (1977).
He has also offered this image as applicable in general: "Women know that, in
general, men tend to be blind to the realities of women's lives. Not just the lives of
women of other racial or ethnic groups, but the daily lives of the women closest to
them, are all but invisible to most men." Kennerth L Karst, Judging and Belonging, 61
So. CAL L REV. 1957, 1959 (1988).
45. Karst, supra note 35, at 472.
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Many women appear to see individual autonomy as threatening not only their
security in the web of relationships, but also their very sense of self. One who
sees herself as continuous with the environment, including the human environ-
ment, may believe that she will have to give up her affiliations in order to be an
autonomous person. Part of the problem is that a woman is apt to see autonomy
in conflict with other goals that she values, such as compassion. Most fundamen-
tally of all, she is apt to find the quest for autonomy illusory.*
The following quotation divides the genders without qualification and
indicates that women's self-definition precludes both narrow conscious-
ness and naked self-dealing: "Men, finding identity in separation, tend to
equate adulthood with autonomy and individual achievement; women,
defining themselves as continuous with others, tend to equate maturity
with responsibility and care."'
B Conclusion
This image of selfish, consciousness-bounded men, of a social category
with an ethos different from that of women, is necessary to the very
possibility of a "woman's constitution." It forms a key element of the
notion that our constitutional regime would be affected by "add[ing] a
healthy measure of the morality and world view characteristic of our
society's female half."'
Obviously, "society's female half" cannot be defined without reference
to how the other half allegedly lives, either by implication or by explicit
oppositional construct. Gilligan herself employs this "define against"
method over and over.' Karst never acknowledges that his postulated
male epistenics-ethos forms an image that helps make the current (male-
created and male-dominated) constitutional regime appear categorically
alien to a woman-inflected constitutional regime.
Karst's text gives no evidence that he realizes the necessity or the
presence of a unified andric image that exists alongside his different
46. ld. at 479.
47. Id. at 483. This is another quotation that universalizes men and connects women
with the metaphor of noncircumscribed being-the "web of connection": "No man has
had a woman's experience, and most men, having found their identities in separation,
will begin by fearing the web of connection. Women themselves may fear the conse-
quences of seriously attempting to offer men new perspectives on something so close
to the sense of self." Id. at 508.
48. Id. at 449. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
49. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982) (especially Chapters Two and Three).
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image of women, his "gynic" image. Karst, in the title of his article and
on practically every page, posits a "woman's constitution," but he never
directly avows his image of the current constitutional regime as male, or
as "man's constitution." He never directly displays the structural under-
pinning of "man's constitution," a cohesive andric image. This image has
to be pulled out of the text. Unlike Karst's image of women, the andric
image does not form an obvious, acknowledged element of his argument,
even though it serves the function of forming the basis of a constitution-
al regime's character.
IV. CATHARINE MACKINNON
This section will illustrate the thematic centrality of an unusual, repeti-
tive andric generalization that appears in three articles by Catharine
MacKinnon. This image of maleness is an association of male and men
with the visual, with viewing and seeing. The visual or "ocular" andric
image seems to be located close to the heart of MacKinnon's general
ideas about pornography, epistemology, the state, power, and
objectification. It may form all of the hard, lucid content of these general
ideas. MacKinnon's ocular andric image is as striking as it is important,
although the image may be most striking after demonstrating its thematic
centrality in several articles.
The three articles which follow will be discussed individually, although
there is more than a small amount of content, andric imagery, and the-
matic overlap between them. They are discussed individually so as to
demonstrate the various, specific roles played by the image in each arti-
cle. The articles are arranged in the following order: Not A Moral Is-
sue,' Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech,"1 and Feminism, Marx-
ism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence.'
A. The Andric Image in the Meaning of Pornography: One
In Not A Moral Issue,' MacKinnon concentrates on defining pornogra-
phy. As an aspect of this task, she fleshes out the idea that pornography
is crucially political. For example, obscenity law is reflective of male
morals, "meaning the standpoint of male dominance," while the "feminist
critique of pornography is [women's] politics ... meaning the standpoint
50. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Not A Moral Issue, 2 YALi L & POL'y RE V. 321 (1984).
51. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-
C.L L REv. 1 (1985).
52. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 635 (1983).
53. MacKinnon, supra note 50.
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of the subordination of women to men."' More generally, her "text as a
whole is intended to communicate what [she] mean[s] by pornogra-
phy." The object here will be to delineate the repetitive andric general-
ization in this communication of meaning.
MacKinnon's essay is loosely structured. First, she delineates a critique
of pornography.' She later concentrates on the dehumanization of wom-
en by pornography and then contrasts obscenity law with a feminist po-
litical attack on pornography." These sections are highly interrelated.
MacKinnon's first section communicates her theory of pornography and
introduces her main thematics. The discussion will, therefore, concen-
trate on this section.'
MacKinnon introduces the first section by asserting that "[p]orn-
ography, in. the feminist view, is a form of forced sex, a practice of sexu-
al politics, an institution of gender inequality."' Further, "pornography
institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy, which fuses the erotiza-
tion of dominance and submission with the social construction of male
and female.'
Knowing how pornography relates to or constitutes male supremacy
and the contours between male and female, the reader also learns that
the external relations and the internal space of pornography are rooted
in a particular, peculiar image of men and male. Pornography, as a politi-
cally operative force and a conceptual category, is defined as conjoined
with an ocular focus in male consciousness: "Men treat women as who
they see women as being. Pornography constructs who that is. Men's
power over women means that the way men see women defines who
women can be. Pornography is that way."6'
54. Id. at 322-23 (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 321 n.l.
56. 1d at 325-29.
57. Id. at 329-45.
58. There are two other reasons for concentrating on this first section. First, be-
cause the discussion here focuses on the formative relation of the general andric image
to a range of higher-order theoretical claims in several of MacKinnon's texts, it will
help to bring out clearly the constancy of this relation to remain directed toward the
conceptually gossamer sections of MacKinnon's texts. Second, as will be demonstrated
in the discussion of all three articles, MacKinnon's general view of pornography and
the underlying general andric image are intimately related to her view of the state,
objectification, power, and epistemology.
59. Id. at 325.
60. Id. at 326 (footnote omitted).
61. Id. This ocular focus is featured in MacKinnon's elaboration of men's sexualized
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The ocular andric image is significantly placed within MacKinnon's
construct of pornographic, pervasively objectified sexual reality:
[Pornography is] the level of reality on which sex itself largely operates .... The
aesthetic of pornography itself, the way it provides what those who consume it
want, is itself the evidence. When... pornography tells all, all means what a dis-
tant detached observer would report about who did what to whom. This is the
turn-on. Why does OBSERVING SEX objectively presented cause the MALE VIEW-
ER to experience his own sexuality? Because his eroticism is, socially, a
WATCHED THING.0
Continuing to deploy the andric image, the next paragraph further
outlines the association of objectification with sex by confirming a con-
sequential epistemological slant on these relations:
If objectivity is the epistemological stance of which objectification is the social
process, the way a PERCEPTUAL POSTURE is embodied as a social forn of pow-
er, the most sexually potent depictions... would be the most objective blow-by-
blow representations .... MEN HAVE SEX WITH THEIR IMAGE OF A WOM-
AN .... It is not that life and art imitate each other, in sexuality, they are each
other.'
Later sections of the article continue to use ocular imagery to describe
maleness. For example, "male morality SEES that which maintains its
power over women: "In pornography, women desire dispossession and cruelty. MEN,
permitted to put words (and other things) in women's mouths, CREATE SCENES in
which women desperately want to be bound, battered, tortured, humiliated, and killed.
Or, merely taken and used. This is erotic to the MALE point of VIEW." Id, (emphasis
added). The ocular tincture of pornography and male is present in other works by
MacKinnon. For example, "[P]ornographic meaning [is] that the woman is defined to be
acted upon, a sexual object, a sexual thing-the VIEWING is an act, an act of MALE
supremacy." CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 130 (1987) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED].
62. MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 328. "Watched thing" does not necessarily extend
the ocular image of consciousness and desire beyond men because one can interpret
that sentence to mean only that male eroticism is activated by the ocular notion of
"watching." MacKinnon seems to locate male erotic consciousness in a sort of deep
voyeurism, one that permeates "male sexual thinking" with mental peeping.
63. Id. at 328-29 (emphasis added). MacKinnon obviously uses "image" in the visual
sense. A passage containing many of the same ideas but somewhat different phraseolo-
gy appears in Feminism Unmodified:
rm claiming that ["the nonsituated, distanced standpoint"] is the MALE
standpoint socially, and I'm going to try to say why. I will argue that the
relationship between objectivity as the stance from which the world is known
and the world that is apprehended in this way is the relationship of
objectification. Objectivity is the epistemological stance of which
objectification is the social process, of which MALE dominance is the poli-
tics, the acted-out social process. THAT IS, TO LOOK AT THE WORLD OB-
JECTIVELY is to objectify it. The act of control, of which what I have de-
scribed is the epistemological level, is itself eroticized under male supremacy.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 61, at 50 (emphasis added).
1006
[Vol. 20: 991, 1993] Feminist Legal Theory
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
power as good."" Also, "obscenity is that sex that makes male sexuality
LOOK bad."' Finally, "[p]ornography can invent women because it has
the power to make its VISION into reality, which then passes, objective-
ly, for truth."'
The following final quotation intriguingly suggests the political import
of the senses, and the reference to objectification (in light of the above
discussion) probably indicates that MacKinnon ascribes special signifi-
cance to visual sense perceptions: "No critique of dominance or subjec-
tion, certainly not of objectification, can be grounded in a vision of reali-
ty in which all sense perceptions are just sense perceptions." '
B. The Andric Image in the Meaning of Pornography: Two
In Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech,- published the year after
Not A Moral Issue, MacKinnon delivers a similar analysis of pornography
that employs the same ocular andric imagery. In fact, she sometimes
64. MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 331 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at ' 334 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at '337 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). While it appears that MacKinnon
is fond of using words like "sees" or "views" to denote "thinks," "regards," "opines,"
"feels," etc., she consistently employs ocular terms to male perspectival existence and
uses ocular terms in her depictions of the coordinated andric structure of sex-episte-
mology-power, etc.
67. Id. at 342. Interestingly, the only other feminist theorist who uses ocular andric
imagery is Andrea Dworkin, whom MacKinnon credits at the beginning of Not A Moral
Issue in the following way. "Many of the ideas in this essay were developed and
refined in close collaboration with Andrea Dworkin. It is consequently difficult at times
to distinguish the contribution of each of us to a body of work that . . . has been
created together." Id. at 321 n.l.
The following quotations are a sample of ocular andric imagery in Dworkin's
texts. She has associated the penis with the pornographer's camera: "The camera
becomes part of the sexual action. The camera is not a substitute for the penis; rather
it is if he had two." ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 42 (1981)
[hereinafter DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY]. Another example explicates the viewer connection:
"The camera is the penile presence, the viewer is the male who participates in the
sexual action, which is not within the photograph but in the perception of it." Id. at
46. Dworkin has tied male sexual fear to the anxieties associated with the inability to
see: "[In intercourse] his penis is gone-disappeared inside someone else, enveloped,
smothered, in the muscled lining of the flesh that HE NEVER SEES . . . can he get
out alive? seems a fundamental anxiety that fuels male sexual compulsiveness and the
whole discipline of depth psychology." ANDREA DWORIN, INTERCOURSE 64 (1986) (em-
phasis added) [hereinafter DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE].
68. MacKinnon, supra note 51, at 1.
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uses the identical rhetorical format. For example: "Men treat women as
who they see women as being. Pornography constructs who that is.
Men's power over women means that the way men see women defines
who women can be.'
Much of Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech is a detailed, some-
what lawyerly explanation and defense of the anti-pornography ordi-
nance written by MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin." Because this Article
seeks to relate the ocular andric image to MacKinnon's general conceptu-
al framework, the overarching ideas animating her political activity,7
this Article will again discuss only the manifestations of the image and
her general conception of the meaning of pornography.
As in Not A Moral Issue, MacKinnon constructs a sexuality-epistemolo-
gy-politics/power structure. This is introduced in both essays by a judi-
cial anecdote which 'receives longer treatment in Pornography, Civil
Rights and Speech:'
[I discuss] pornography by connecting epistemology-which I understand to be
about theories of knowing-with politics-which I will take to be about theories
of power. For instance, when Justice Stewart said of obscenity, "I know it when I
see it," that is even more interesting than it is usually taken to be, if viewed as a
statement connecting epistemology-what he knows through his way of knowing,
IN THIS CASE, SEEING-with the fact that his SEEING determines what obsceni-
ty is in terms of what he SEES IT TO BE, because of his position of power.'
Within the confines of this sex-knowing-power structure, pornography
looms large, and is itself related to a crucial ocular-object, male-serving
reality that has defined the current perceptions of sexuality and gender.
The object world is constructed according to how it looks with respect to its
possible uses. Pornography defines women by how we look according to how we
can be sexually used. Pornography codes how to look at women, so you know
what you can do with one when you see one. Gender is an assignment made visu-
ally, both originally and in everyday life. A sex object is defined on the basis of its
looks, in terms of its usability for sexual pleasure, such that both the looking-the
quality of the gaze, including its point of view-and the definition according to
use become eroticized as part of the sex itself. This is what the feminist concept
.sex object" means. In this sense, sex in life is no less mediated than it is in art.
One could say that men have sex with their image of a woman. It is not that life
and art imitate each other, in this sexuality, they are each other.'
69. Id, at 18. See MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 326.
70. MacKinnon, supra note 51, at 22-68.
71. See supra note 58.
72. For the version in Not A Moral Issue, see MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 325.
73. MacKinnon, supra note 51, at 3 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The Stew-
art quotation comes from Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., con-
curring). For an elaboration of the sex-knowing-power structure in Pornography, Civil
Rights and Speech (which is very similar to that offered in Not A Moral Issue), see
MacKinnon, supra note 51, at 17-20.
74. Id. at 19.
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This passage is a description of what MacKinnon refers to later as the
"pornographic view" of women.' The final three sentences, quoted earli-
er in their almost identical form from Not A Moral Issue,' are the
graphic capstone to an exegesis of the centrality of males' ocular con-
sciousness to sexuality and gender.
C. The Andric Image, Gender, Law, and the State
In Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Ju-
risprudence, MacKinnon offers a general political theory continually
featuring the ocular andric generalization. In fact, this essay most reveal-
ingly reflects MacKinnon's penchant for this image because she applies it
most broadly to various general concepts. This Article will briefly illus-
trate this claim by reproducing the range of these concepts and their
internal andric image.'
MacKinnon's basic theme in this essay is best described as "toward a
feminist jurisprudence as a means of developing a criticism of The
State." As in the two essays discussed previously, she incorporates the
ocular andric generalization into her main arguments in several ways.
First, she reproduces the connection between objectified reali-
ty/knowing and harmful ocularity: "At least since Plato's cave, visual
metaphors for knowing have been central to Western theories of knowl-
edge, the visual sense prioritized as a mode of verification. The relation-
ship between visual appropriation and objectification is now only begin-
ning to be explored." '
Second, this crucial ocular image becomes gendered by the cumulative
force of repetition. For example, "male dominance ... is metaphysically
nearly perfect. Its point of VIEW is the standard for point-of-
viewlessness."' Also, keeping in mind MacKinnon's use of "image" in
75. Id. at 60.
76. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
77. MacKinnon, supra note 52, at 635.
78. One could perform parallel analyses on similar works, including Catherine A.
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7
SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y 515 (1982) and CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989). However, this Article's demonstration of her use
of this andric image sufficiently indicates its repeated and versatile central usage in
MacKinnon's writings.
79. MacKinnon, supra note 52, at 636 n.4.
80. Id. at 638-39 (emphasis added).
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the sense of "visual" or "pictorial,"8 "the male point of VIEW is seen as
fundamental to the male power to create the world in its own image, the
image of its desires."' In addition, "[c]riminal enforcement... punishes
men for expressing the images of masculinity that mean their identity."'
Third, and more significant, this critical ocular image becomes
gendered very explicitly at the levels of the law and the state. In fact,
MacKinnon seems to say that the ocular image helps create the gendered
character of the law and the state. For example, "law sees and treats
women the way men see and treat women.' Also, "the way the male
point of view frames an experience is the way it is framed by state poll-
cy."' MacKinnon describes the gender of the state as follows: "Formally,
the state is male in that objectivity is its norm. Objectivity is liberal
legalism's conception of itself. It legitimizes itself by reflecting its view of
existing society, a society it made and makes by so seeing it, and calling
that view, and that relation, practical rationality."M
D. Conclusion
These articles demonstrate the importance and versatility of the pecu-
liar andric image in MacKinnon's writings. This image embodies a set of
representations of men and male as associated with seeing and viewing,
with the ocular sense faculty. The image is featured in various texts as
the main element of her description of a philosophy of law, the state,
81. See supra note 63.
82. MacKinnon, supra note 52, at 640 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 643.
84. Id, at 644.
85. Id. This quote uses the visual metaphor of the painting/picture/photo frame.
Andrea Dworldn has used this metaphor in the ocular andric image as well: "[Women]
live in the male frame; pinned there." DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE, supra note 67, at 113.
Dworkin may also be referring more generally to the "male gaze." Shelagh Young
discusses the phenomenon of the social "gaze" in Feminism and the Politics of Power:
Whose Gaze is it Anyway? in THE FEMALE GAZE (L Gamman et al. eds., 1989).
86. MacKinnon, supra note 52, at 644-45. A further quotation from this article pro-
vides another example of her ocular genderization of the state (keep in mind the clear
association of "see" and "view" in the previously cited quotation, and notice the use of
"blind"):
[Tihe state will appear most relentless in imposing the male point of view
when it comes closest to achieving its highest formal criterion of distanced
aperspectivity. When it is most ruthlessly neutral, it will be most male; when
it is most sex blind, it will be most blind to the sex of the standard being
applied.
Id. at 658. Elsewhere, MacKinnon has distilled the image into an ultimately general
account of its centrality to male supremacy: "Feminism has revealed nature and society
to be mirrors of each other, the male gender looking at itself looking at itself."
MacKinnon, supra note 51, at 16.
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pornography, etc., as well as the relationships between these notions.
Her overall coordinated theory seems somewhat abstract and lacking
in intelligible content. The andric image, however, is quite clear and fo-
cused. This disjunction is probably because, in these texts, MacKinnon's
specific characterization of men and male has to perform too much
grand-level conceptual work.' A highly-focused, specialized image of
men and male is repeated numerous times as she moves through a ma-
trix of relations between very general and sketchy ideas.
Other problems are implicated with MacKinnon's use of the ocular
andric image. Her ocular image is an example of the figure of speech
known as metonymy. Metonymy is the term for the replacement of the
denotative name of something by "a different name that relates to a
quality, attribute or characteristic of a thing." Thus, MacKinnon has re-
placed "man" or "male human" with an image of them as not much more
than the visual faculty, a physical attribute or characteristic. Further-
more, she uses that metonymic structure to outline the high-level politi-
cal-philosophical content of some of her jurisprudential texts.
This reduction of males to a sense faculty presents three problems.
First, MacKinnon's method of presenting her notion of ocular male in-
volvement in world-construction-the method of repetitive incantation of
the metonymic image-remains unconvincing because MacKinnon offers
nothing else. The reader must simply accept its veracity. Second, the
reduction of males to a single sense faculty seems less likely to implicate
them in male supremacy than a construct that would implicate all of
their faculties in a selfish enterprise of power maintenance. Third,
MacKinnon's metonymic construct is faulty because she starts her reduc-
tion using only half of the species. Throughout the relevant portions of
these texts, she operates as though only males are so describable.' It is
87. MacKinnon's work is full of important andric imagery; however, this Article dis-
cusses only one image. Recall also that this Article is concerned only with her use of
a particular andric image to inform her general theoretical claims in several articles.
88. CELEsrE CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC 227 (1990).
89. Two other rhetorical concepts may assist in explaining the andric image used by
MacKinnon in these texts. These concepts may grant more lucidity to MacKinnon's
major thematic ideas discussed previously.
First, the concept of "framing" provides assistance. Framing, according to Celeste
Condit, embodies the "ue of ambiguity and multiple interlocking themes to construct a
simple, singular square that limits and controls the meaning of some significant object
or event." I. at 226. This Article does not ascribe this motive to MacKinnon, nor does
it assert that she incorporates a technical understanding of rhetoric into her jurispru-
dence; however, MacKinnon's ocular image remains intimately connected with her
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literally as if only men have eyes.
V. SUZANNA SHERRY
The discussion here of crucial andric imagery in Suzanna Sherry's
work centers on her 1986 article, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice
in Constitutional Adjudication.' Sherry's article provides a detailed
assertion of connections between a nascent feminine jurisprudence and
classical republican theory. She claims to use these asserted connections
or similarities to predict major changes in contemporary American law
and jurisprudence.
As a preface to the demonstration of the formative role of andric gen-
eralizations in that text, a brief discussion of another article that Sherry
published earlier in 1986 is warranted. This article, The Gender of Judg-
es,' provides a good starting point for an examination of the andric imag-
ery in Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion.' First, it candidly presents a commitment to a definite, differential
characterization of the genders as the basis of her jurisprudential
views.' Second, it also predicts gender-derived transformations in Amer-
ican law. Third, it is a partial, brief summary of Civic Virtue.
In The Gender of Judges, Sherry begins by arguing three ways in which
female judges differ significantly from male judges. She asserts that
"[w]omen judges make a unique contribution to the legal system by their
presence, their participation, and their perspective."" She discounts the
vague, major ideas through framing. This renders the formative axis between her
andric image and her major themes bi-directional. The entire purpose of the argument
in the main text is to show how the image forms whatever clear content there is in
her interlocking (because of the image) and vast abstractions.
The second helpful concept is "presence." Condit defines presence as "the ability
of rhetoric to give more force to particular symbols, acts, agents, etc., or to make
them more salient simply by repetition." Id. at 228. The term is derived from C.
Perelman and L Olbrechts-Tyeca, THE NEW RHETORIC. The argument in the main text
demonstrates the sheer repetitive volume of the ocular andric image. This establishes
that the salience of the principal ideas may be a function of the image's presence in
the Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyeca sense. That is, because the image is the hard content of
the major concepts, their presence is a function of the image's presence.
90. Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudi-
cation, 72 VA. L REv. 543 (1986).
91. Suzanna Sherry, The Gender of Judges, 4 LAw AND INEQ. J. 159 (1986).
92. See Sherry, supra note 90, at 543.
93. In this sense, it resembles Kenneth Karst's The Pursuit of Manhood and the De-
segregation of the Armed Forces, 38 U.C.LA. L. REV. 499 (1991). See supra notes 37-39
and accompanying text (discussing The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of
the Armed Forces).
94. Sherry, supra note 91, at 159.
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future influence of the first two factors because they "may decrease in
significance as discrimination wanes."' However, the feminine judicial
perspective will survive because it is not a function of temporary female
judicial rarity.-
Sherry devotes most of her article to discussing this viable feminine
perspective. Her view of the current existence and future presence of the
feminine perspective within judging and law is explicitly based on andric
generalizations. She adopts the view that men regard themselves as inde-
pendent and autonomous and that they use noncontextuality and abstrac-
tion in resolving interpersonal disputes.' Further, her research indicates
that women have a self-conception that emphasizes connection and, thus,
resolve disputes by emphasizing context and not abstract rules."
This Giliganian picture is the basis for Sherry's subsequent discussion
in Civic Virtue and her conclusions about the future of a new and femi-
nine perspective in law.' Having stated the above gender associations,
Sherry proceeds to a broad, gender-based description of American poli-
tics and law.'" She describes our current regime as wedded to abstrac-
tion and oblivious to context.' According to Sherry, American political
theory has abstracted us into rights-bearers.'02 This penchant for ab-
straction requires a values-agnostic, "pluralist political structure" because
our rights-based political system cannot express "official preference for
specific values."'
However, a "feminine society... makes decisions based on what is
95. Id.
96. Id Sherry defines the feminine perspective as follows:
By the "feminine perspective," I do not mean the political agenda associated
with feminism, but rather a distinctly feminine way of looking at the world.
A feminist perspective is an ideology that encompasses the belief that men
and women should have equal roles in society, but does not necessarily
reach other aspects of the social or political structure. A feminine perspec-
tive, on the other hand, encompasses all aspects of society, whether or not
they affect men and women differently.
Id at 160.
97. Id. at 163.
98. Id.
99. See Sherry, supra note 90, at 584-87.
100. 1d at 54547.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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right under the circumstances, not on who has rights in the abstract."'"
Abandoning the abstract, rights-bearer picture of the human requires a
society "to decide what is right.""5 A feminine society will express offi-
cial preference for specific, competing values: "a feminine society is a
virtuous society in the sense that it cannot be pluralist.""
. Sherry affirms the sweeping, transformative implications of this strictly
gender-based picture. She asks, "[What] happens when a contextual, vir-
tue-based woman meets the abstract, rights-based male world? She
changes the shape of that world. In almost every discipline, women are
integrating their feminine perspective into a previously male world
view.
" 10
7
Law is one of the disciplines that is subject to transformation by "[t]he
feminine emphasis on connection and contextuality."' For example,
women judges employ a non-political, feminine model of self and society
that does not fit into the traditional framework of conservative or lib-
eral."5 Also, the very tone of The Law and its previously coercive oper-
ations will be known anew:
Because women are more naturally connected to others, they are more likely to
be governed by true empathy: paternalism grounded not on power, but on the sort
of equation of self and other that causes a driver to fling her arm across the pas-
senger seat when she comes to a sudden stop. Increasing the likelihood of proper
motivation decreases the likelihood of abuse."°
A. Andric Imagery in the Service of a Transformative Civic Virtue-
Feminine Voice Connection
Based on the above, Sherry clearly seems to regard the concepts of
masculine and feminine as denoting different visions of both the self and
the world. In turn, this construct of distinct visions leads her to a brief
and general predictive picture. This gender split reappears in the much
longer and more complex Civic Virtue."'
In fact, Sherry claims that these different gendered visions are the
basis of her thesis in Civic Virtue: the increased presence of women in
law is related to a possible paradigm shift toward neo-republicanism.
104. Id. at 164.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id at 165.
109. Id. at 165-66. Sherry asserts that Justice O'Connor is a good example of this
model. Id,
110. Id at 169.
111. Sherry, supra note 90, at 543.
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This Article proposes that the specific image of the makers and users of
Sherry's modem, liberal paradigm as males who have excluded women
from law is much more important to the plausibility and strength of her
thesis. This is because she muddles away the general gender dichotomy
in Civic Virtue, leaving only the particular image of exclusionary men as
the textual basis of her thesis.
112
In Civic Virtue, Sherry links gender to general political theories.
3
She asserts that "the masculine vision parallels pluralist liberal theory,
[while] the feminine vision is more closely aligned with classical republi-
can theory, represented in its various forms by Aristotle, Machiavelli, and
Jefferson."" Thus, women's entry into the legal profession in large
numbers indicates that a "paradigm shift in moral, political, and constitu-
tional theory" might result from the advent of a distinctly feminine ju-
risprudence tied to the classical republican revival."'
Thus, a distinctively feminine jurisprudence would help the resuscita-
tion of republicanism:
This article suggests... that modem liberalism is a characteristically masculine
response to the failure of Jeffersonian republicanism. Because the masculine per-
spective has been the dominant-and virtually the sole-influence on the legal
and political structure, that structure is bound to reflect a more masculine or
liberal emphasis on liberalism over community. A feminine jurisprudence, instead
of rejecting the communitarian and virtue-based framework of Jeffersonian repub-
licanism., might embrace and adapt it for modem society."'
Her argument proceeds through four stages, of which the first two are
background. These first two stages feature only the type of self-acknowl-
edged, dichotomizing gender-based imagery contained in The Gender of
Judges and are not discussed below. In Civic Virtue, she first applies an
historical introduction to the basic distinctions between liberal theory
and a classical, Aristotelian, virtue-oriented political paradigm."7 Sec-
ond, she maps the American transition from a classical perspective to a
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. I&
116. Id. st 544. The feminine-republican link operates on the level of using
oppositions of the "men are autonomous, women are connected" type to assert the
masculinity of our regime's current grounding and the femininity of classical republican
theory. For example, Sherry states: The classical paradigm's theme of connection pro-
vides a stark contrast to the autonomous theme of the modem view." Id. at 547.
117. See Sherry, supra note 90, at 543-62 (covering the first two stages).
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liberal, Lockean, individualist paradigm."'
The next two stages deal with the present and future. By way of defin-
ing in detail the current state of dominant affairs, she describes the mod-
ern setting of conservative, liberal, and radical jurisprudence."' Lastly,
the article explores the contours of "the basic feminine alternative" to
modern jurisprudence," with a final focus on Justice O'Connor's opin-
ions as a test case of that alternative.1
2
'
Sherry's thesis of a "feminine alternative""= to the "modern [mascu-
line or liberal] paradigm""= is crucially dependent on andric imagery in
a way she does not acknowledge. Her theme is textually dependent on
her characterization of men as excluders of women. This image operates
on a level far removed from a simple and general dichotomization of
men as abstract and autonomous and women as contextual and con-
nected. This dependence is present in the last two stages of her argu-
ment.
Stated differently, this Article will not argue that Sherry's thematics are
fueled by her avowed, general, and basic differentiation of the genders
along Gilliganian lines. The above discussion of The Gender of Judges
served such a function. Rather, her positing of a feminine jurispru-
dence is rooted in highly particular imagery of men as gender excluders.
This image produces the viability of the last two subparts of her argu-
ment.
These latter portions of Civic Virtue do not assert the bifurcation of
consciousness or moral sensibility by gender. Therefore, Sherry does not
root this text's posited feminine jurisprudence in general, gender-based
world-views. Instead, Sherry roots the feminine jurisprudence in the
coherent image of the exclusionary male makers and users of the mod-
em paradigm. The argument below tracks this presentation of what the
unavowed andric imagery has to accomplish in the text.
1. Feminine Revival of the Classical Paradigm
As stated above, in Civic Virtue, Sherry explores the possibility of a
feminine/neo-republican alternative to the male, modern paradigm."
She first advances this idea generally and then analyzes a number of Jus-
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 1d. at 593-616.
122. Id. at 543-2.
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 91-110 and accompanyin text.
125. See Sherry, supra note 90, at 543.
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tice O'Connor's 1981-1986 Supreme Court opinions as a test case." The
text itself demonstrates that her hypothesis cannot be supported by gen-
eral level gendered imagery of the "men are abstract, women are contex-
tual" variety.'27
There are numerous textual clues indicating that Sherry does not be-
lieve men and women have different moral and cognitive frameworks.
First, she undercuts her own claim at the outset that, paraphrasing Vir-
ginia Woolf, a woman's jurisprudence is always feminine."u The follow-
ing quotation seems to problematize the possibility of the creation of
such a jurisprudence through the entry of women into law: "Astute read-
ers might ask why this article itself contains an abundance of references
to [abstract] paradigms and structures... [however,] women's fluency in
the masculine voice" reflects their success in education.'" More funda-
mental change would seem to be required. Second, Sherry qualifies her
assertion of the bifurcation of the genders so often that the dichotomy
collapses.
Sherry states that "women in fact MAY have a unique perspective, a
world-view that differs in significant respects from that of men."'" Fur-
ther, she notes that "women's moral development and concept of self
MAY differ from those of men.'3' Also, basic "difference[s] between men
and women MAY influence the manner in which they think about, write
about, and practice their disciplines."" Sherry states: "It has long been
recognized that women MAY make unique contributions to specific areas
of law."'" Finally, she writes that "women's views on the law in general
MAY provide insights and approaches that are less natural to, and there-
fore less available to, male lawyers and judges.""
Third, her introductory adumbration of the feminine paradigm mixes
the genders up into a soup that cannot be strained: "[T]he feminine per-
spective strongly resembles the classical paradigm while the masculine
perspective strongly resembles the modem paradigm. Although all of us
HAVE some mix of the two paradigms in our own world-view,., the
126. Id, at 593-616.
127. Id,
128. Id at 543.
129. I& at 569 n.123.
130. Id. at 580 (emphasis added).
131. Id, (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 581 (emphasis added).
133. Id, at 581 n.169 (emphasis added).
134. I& (emphasis added).
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classical perspective MAY be more dominant in women." " If we all in-
ternally possess the two political paradigms, then there is no reason to gen-
der-identify either paradigm."
Even if one accepts that genderization of the paradigms exists because
"the classical perspective may be more dominant in women," then more
difficulty develops.' 7 Sherry insists that her construct is non-political,
arguing that the "feminine perspective.., encompasses aspects of per-
sonality and relationship to the world that have nothing to do with one's
political preferences."' This notion presents two insuperable problems.
First, what could Sherry possibly mean? One suspects she might mean
"purely" psychological phenomena, but the reader must guess. She distin-
guishes "feminist perspective" by maintaining that "feminists have a par-
ticular political agenda."" However, her main overarching point in both
Civic Virtue and The Gender of Judges is that the feminine perspective
does constitute a fully elaborated public alternative to the modem auton-
omy and individualism paradigm.
This implicates a second problem with Sherry's dichotomization of the
genders. If the "feminine perspective" is non-political, one must ask if the
same is true of the "masculine perspective." " In other words, is her
brief characterization of the relationship between "feminine" and "femi-
nist" a guide to her characterization of the relationship between "mascu-
line" and an undefined conceptual entity that could be labelled "sexist"
135. Id. at 579 (emphasis added). Sherry later contradicts this notion that we all pos-
sess elements of both paradigms. In discussing Kenneth Karst's article Women's Con-
stitution, she writes: "Karat is correct to disclaim the ability of a male to explore a
feminine paradigm." Id. at 583 n.172 (citing Kenneth L Karst, Woman's Constitution,
1984 DuKE LJ. 447 (1984)).
136. Briefly, points one through three would seem to undermine the basis for
Sherry's notion that Justice O'Connor's work on the Supreme Court indicates the
nascent feminine paradigm. Sherry, however, does engage in an extended discussion of
individual opinions to argue for "feminine aspects of [O'Connor's] jurisprudence." Sher-
ry, supra note 90, at 592. See id. at 592-616.
Two additional criticisms vitiate her data. She states the first herself: "This data
cannot be quantified or proven scientifically and is thus open to criticism that it is
possible to find indications of a feminine perspective in the writings of any Justice."
Id. at 592 n.212. Her further assertion that "I doubt whether an analysis of any other
Justice's work would yield a [similar] pattern" is not verified. Id, Second, each opinion
she discusses either features male signatories, reference to communitarianism or other
gender-ambiguous conceptual categories, or references to gender-ambiguous human
characteristics such as "compassion." See id. at 593-613.
137. Id. at 579.
138. Id. at 583 (footnote omitted).
139. Id. This language suggests that Sherry views feminist programmatics as smaller
in scope ("particular political agenda") than the feminine perspective. See supra note
96.
140. See supra text accompanying note 138.
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or "masculinist" or "patriarchal?" The reader might wonder if such a
distinction is intelligible at all, given Sherry's attempt to distinguish "fem-
inine" from "feminist" and her retreat from a solid gender division at the
level of general world-views.'
2. "The Jurisprudence of the Modem Paradigm"""
The section of Civic Virtue discussing "the jurisprudence of the mod-
em paradigm" and passages characterizing "the modem paradigm" else-
where in the article contain the clear gender imagery necessary to rescue
Sherry's posited feminine jurisprudence from the contradictions, dis-
claimers, and qualifications that seem to have rendered it improbable on
her own textual terms."i Because Sherry muddles and denies the "men
are abstract, women are contextual" dichotomy that ostensibly fuels her
thesis, some other type of gender imagery must be present to render a
supercessionary or rising feminine jurisprudence plausible.'"
This imagery is contained in her discussion of what she claims is the
modem paradigm in American law. Sherry commonalizes contemporary
conservative, liberal, and radical jurisprudence by claiming that
"[i]ndividual autonomy serves as the underlying paradigm" for each. 5
She claims that this tripartite division of modem legal thought is charac-
terized by -an atomistic view of the self in society." Also, she claims
that this view of the self undergirds dominant modem American legal
consciousness.'4
As stated above, Sherry's critical gender imagery characterizes the
makers and users of the modem paradigm as exclusionary males. There
141. Sherry, supra note 90, at 582-84. Even if one rejects the claim that Sherry voids,
disclaims, or muddles the basic Gilliganian dichotomy, the second stage of
the argument survives. The second stage identifies an unacknowledged andric image
that produces a phenomenological basis for a feminine jurisprudence. The Gilliganian
image (which is incoherently and contradictorily presented in Civic Virtue) is basically
an argument drawn from psychology. The unacknowledged andric image, described in
detail below, sets in motion an historical basis for feminine jurisprudential singularity.
In sum, the image identifed below may not be sufficient to rescue Sherry's posit of a
feminine jurisprudence, but it at least provides some alternative grounding.
142. Id. at 563.
143. Id at 563-74.
144. Id. at 587.
145. Id at 562.
146. Id. at 544-45.
147. Id.
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are numerous passages in Civic Virtue that add a male monopolization
dimension to her notion that gendered jurisprudential paradigms super-
sede each other. For example: "[Blecause women have been excluded
from shaping our legal structure in general, that structure reflects a dis-
torted view of the tension between autonomy and connection and be-
tween the individual and society."'4
Her text also images modern jurisprudes as male and actively
exclusionary. At times the exclusion is intellectual. Her example of the
conservative portion of the modem paradigm is Robert Nozick, who
"denies entirely the validity of any doctrine that recognizes connection or
community as a separate and valuable principle."" He excludes women
by implication because their perspective is discordant. According to
Sherry, the liberal jurisprudence of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin like-
wise does not admit of a non-individualist ethic: "Rawls, like Dworkin,
builds his entire jurisprudence around an individualist conception of hu-
man nature."'
It appears that liberal jurisprudence is completely outside the feminine
ethos, according to Sherry:
In addition to a decidedly individualist bias, liberal jurisprudence exhibits two
other traits characteristic of the modem paradigm: liberalism epitomizes an ab-
stract, rule-based theory, and liberalism is a highly pluralistic philosophy. In a
world of self-interested individuals, abstract rules or principles are a necessary
alternative to such contextual moral notions as virtue."'
Although it is the result of "closer examination," even radical jurispru-
dence "embodies the individualist paradigm."" Emphasizing Mark
Tushnet, Duncan Kennedy, and Roberto Unger, Sherry asserts that criti-
cal legal thought is part of the autonomy-individualist-abstraction
school.'
Of course, this exclusion at the rarified level of philosophy and para-
digm is muddled by her subsequent disclaimers of any certainty regard-
ing the existence of a feminine perspective and her related acknowledge-
ment of each person's possession of that perspective."M The image,
however, remains strictly andric. The intellectual excluders are all male
148. Id. at 582. See, e.g., id. at 544, 584, 591, and 592 (stating, for example, that "the
Constitution ... is a quintessentially masculine document").
149. Id. at 562 n.88.
150. Id. at 563.
151. Id. at 565 (footnote omitted).
152. Ld. at 567.
153. Id. at 569.
154. Id. at 569-74.
155. See supra notes 117-125 and accompanying text.
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and this assignment of gender is paired with a coherent image of exclu-
sion.
Sherry asserts that men traditionally have kept women down and
out." Note, for example, how theory and practice are linked in the fol-
lowing passage: "It is not so surprising that even a radical movement ex-
cludes the feminine paradigm. Past radical groups have treated women
little better than their liberal or conservative counterparts."'7
This claim may actually save her gendered jurisprudence from the criti-
cism that she has commingled and disclaimed her earlier assertions
about men and women to such an extent that it is impossible, on her
own terms, to speak of anything as jurisprudentially gendered. First, her
image of the current paradigm is andric in that she populates it entirely
with exclusionary males. Second, because women do not share with men
this history of American juristic pre-eminence (because of male
exclusionary practices), women have a unique experiential source for
their perspective.
Sherry does offer a phenomenological basis for her model, but it is
textually secondary to her general dichotomization of the genders and
her association of "masculine" with "modem" and "feminine" with "classi-
cal republican." For example, women's knowledge and discourse is
deeply affected by "the masculine voice."'" Also, "the modem paradigm
[may be] an inevitable result of male domination of the public
sphere."" Furthermore, "because women have been excluded from
shaping our legal structure in general, that structure reflects... dis-
tort[ion]."'6'
B Conclusion
Sherry's stated and general differentiation of the genders provides little
support for her construction of a neo-republican, feminine jurisprudence.
Her argument rests more solidly on a notion of gendered jurisprudential
156. Sherry, supra note 90, at 581 ("Women have been excluded from the mainstream
of legal authority and legal change.").
157. Id. at 578 n.163. Sherry goes on to cite the following groups as examples of
radicals' sexist behavior. 1960s civil rights groups, Students for a Democratic Society,
Columbia student protesters in the late 1960s, and CIS itself.
158. Id. at 579.
159. Id. at 569-70 n.123.
160. Id at 579.
161. Id at 582.
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consciousness that is traced from a specific characterization of males as
gender excluders.' The possibility of a feminine jurisprudence, as well
as its ability to update the classical paradigm because of basic resem-
blance, has a phenomenological basis grounded in female exclusion by
males.
This interpretation indicates that Sherry was not in complete control
of the actual foundational andric imagery in this text. Her text, then,
exemplifies the production of a supportable feminist jurisprudential the-
sis through secondary, minor andric imagery that assumes a crucial role
because equivocation and contradiction detract from the author's main,
ostensible characterization of the genders.
VI. ROBIN WEST
This section of the essay demonstrates the critical role played by
andric images in Robin West's feminist jurisprudential writing. Three
articless will be analyzed individually.
In Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law,'" West outlines and
supports "the lack of enthusiasm among at least some feminist legal
theorists for the great transformative ideas of Michel Foucault, Roberto
Unger, poststructuralists, postmodernists and other critical social the-
orists that have so energized critical legal thought." " For West, this dis-
enchantment results from problems with the critical social theorists'
ideas regarding the nature of four items: power, knowledge, the self, and
morality.'6 Her treatment of critical theory and these four items in this
text is consistently rooted in andric imagery.
Two of West's articles develop feminist law-as-literature themes con-
taining pejorative andric images that construct those themes. In The
Feminine Silence: A Response to Professor Koffler,67 West develops the
thesis that the title character in Melville's Billy Budd: Sailor is an em-
bodiment of "feminine" by strictly denigrating "masculine." As her theme
in Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast,TM she valorizes
162. These males have been primarily Mandarins, but some have been of the hoi
poUoi.
163. Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
59; Robin West, The Feminine Silence: A Response to Professor Koffler, I CARDOZO
STUDIES IN L AND LITERATURE 15 (1989); and Robin West, Economic Man and Literary
Woman: One Contrast, 34 MERCER L REV. 867 (1988).
164. Robin West, Feminism Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. OF CHI. LEGAL
F. 59.
165. ld.
166. Id.
167. Robin West, The Feminine Silence: A Reponse to Professor Koffler, I CARDOZO
STUDIES IN L AND IrTERATURE 15 (1989).
168. Robin West, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 MERCER L.
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"literary woman" over "economic man" by drawing a severe contrast
between genders that strictly denigrates men.'
A. Andric Images Underiying West's View of Critical Social Theory
1. Power
In this section of Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, West
discusses the implications for feminist thought of what she terms a basic
tenet (emphasizing Foucault) of critical social theory: the productivity of
power. "Following Foucault's mandate, critical legal scholars collectively
have taught all of us to think of the productivity rather than the negativi-
ty of legal power." '" However, West urges caution upon feminist legal
theorists:
It may be ... that a profoundly negative, censorial, patriarchal power lies behind
the positing and creative forms of modem social and legal power which are the
subject of critical legal and social analysis. If so, we should hardly expect male
critical legal or social theorists to see this, or to adjust their theory according-
.IT
With this statement, West has sketched a connection between the
substance of critical theory and the gender of most of its originators and
adherents." She also connects them here with patriarchy. The argu-
ment below is that her problematization of the critics' notion of power is
actually grounded in several concrete generalizations about males,
whether they be critical theorists or not.
West formulates her Cassandran admonition about power as follows: "I
want to urge, even plead, that we turn down the Foucaultian invitation to
REv. 867 (1988).
169. Id. at 868-73.
170. West, supra note 164, at 60.
171. Id at 61.
172. West gives other clues that she views critical social theory as male. For exam-
ple, addressing feminists, she states that one of the problems with critical social theory
is that "critical philosophical vision . . . , like the enlightenment vision it seeks to re-
place, has not been of our making." I& at 97. She has made the identification else-
where:
The Hobbesian story of the state of nature (and the critical story of alien-
ation as well) is a synthesis of umpteen thousands of personal, subjective,
everyday male experiences. Images are generated from that synthesis, and
those images, sometimes articulate, sometimes not, of what it means to be a
human being then become the starting point of legal theory.
Robin West, Jurisprudence and.Gender, 55 U. CH. L REV. 1, 64 (1988).
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think of power in primarily positive terms. My reason is very simple:
Women's experiences of patriarchal power, told and retold in feminist
texts, are profoundly unlike anything imagined in Foucault's philoso-
phies." " West says that women experience patriarchal control as vio-
lent, not as "discursive productivity." As long as this condition persists,
the urge to discuss power as positive "is of little use to feminism." 4
Her focus, however, turns out to be on men. Most of the points made
by West in elaboration of her caveat feature a crucial, cumulative andric
generalization of men as oblivious. Her first point is that feminist com-
prehension of patriarchy requires investigation of "its utterly non-discur-
sive and silencing violence."' She feels this to be the case
"[plarticularly if we want to understand it from women's point of
view .... [If so,] we must not focus obsessively on its talkative, pontifi-
cating and no doubt internally contradictory blabber.""8 Laying aside
West's association of men with patriarchy, the last passage images men
as outside the sphere of pressing understanding, that is, the "women's
point of view."
This notion-"they just don't get it"-is both real and important, as the
reader quickly discovers. West's second criticism of the Foucaultian un-
derstanding of power makes male obliviousness critical and clear:
[Fleminist legal theorists should keep our focus on patriarchal violence, rather
than patriarchal constructs... it is extremely difficult, as feminists inside and
outside of law know, to communicate to men, including critical legal scholars, the
defining role that sexual violence and the fears of sexual violence play in women
and girls' lives.'"
Third, West maintains that male blindness is implicated in the rational-
ization of critical theorists' refusal to see patriarchal violence:
[C]ritical legal scholars increasingly resort to a decidedly hip philosophical jus-
tification for their selective blindness. If the central insights of social theory hold
for patriarchal power as they seem to hold for legal power, they argue, then to
understand law, we should be examining what it has invented rather than what it
has destroyed. ... Social theory, in short, has become yet another excuse for
173. West, supra note 164, at 61.
174. Id. at 61-62.
175. Id, at 62.
176. Id. (footnote omitted).
177. Id. at 62-63. She immediately continues by toying with another generalization, by
way of an explanation for this non-comprehension:
The reason for this, I suspect, is to some degree self-interest. To be blunt, it
is almost impossible not to blind oneself to the violence in the world of
which you are an indirect if not direct beneficiary, and most men do indeed
benefit, at least in the short run, from the sexual violence from which many
women fear or suffer.
Id. at 63 (footnote omitted).
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men to blind themselves to the violence of patriarchy, the destructivity of misogy-
ny and the absolute moral imperative for positive legal intervention on behalf of
women."s
2. Knowledge
In this section of her text, West addresses the "central Foucaultian in-
sight" that humans discursively create the objects of their knowledge,
rather than discover them." She claims that social theory's thesis of
discursive epistemology is problematic because women's knowledge has
been the product of silence: "Much of our feminist work both in and
outside of law is beginning to show that silence is and has been to mod-
em women's lives what Foucault has argued that knowledge and dis-
course are and have been to modem men's.""
West's demonstration of the centrality of silence to women's lives is
accompanied by constant and highly interrelated andric imagery. Modem
women's silence turns out to have a strictly male etiology: coordinated
andric generalizations are incorporated into the reasons for the produc-
tion of that silence. Moreover, these reasons are West's only elaboration
of the concept of "modem women's silence."
First, "modem women's silence" is the product of violence rendered as
male. Citing recent psychological work, West maintains that this silence
is a woman's "way of knowing," developed during an abusive child-
hood.' In addition, silence as a way of knowing "leads to passivity in
the face of violence in adult life as well."' West clearly regards the
face of at least adult violence as male, as is clear from the anecdotal
illustration she uses to demonstrate the silence-passivity-violence interre-
lation: "[T]rying to explain why she stayed with a batterer for ten years,
one woman.., recalled her own voicelessness: 'You know, I used to
only hear HIS words, and HIS words kept coming out of my mouth. HE
had me thinking that I didn't know anything."'
Second, modem women's silence is the product of the "more subtle
178. 1& at 63.
179. Id, at 65.
180. Id, at 66.
181. Id. at 68-69 (citing MARY IELD BELENKEY ET AL, WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING
(1986)).
182. Id. at 69.
183. Id. (emphasis added). The original quotation appears in BELENKY, ET AL, supra
note 181, at 30.
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coercion of an elaborate, alien, and hostile dialogue.""" This "dialogue"
turns out to be male, in that men are "speakers" who can avail them-
selves of their talky epistemology. West asserts that "contemporary and
relatively privileged women law students... opt for or are pushed to-
ward silence in... classrooms, and in significantly greater numbers than
are men.""' She uses the testimony of a woman Yale law student as an
illustration:
I felt unable to keep up with the class and terrified of being exposed to the rest of
the class as unable to match them .... I was very, very quiet, very reserved ....
I basically felt inadequate in all classroom settings, unable to make comments or
to project myself into the conversation, often unable to think as quickly as I
thought others did .... The recklessness, the casual... stance that others
seemed to achieve-I just couldn't."
Third, modem women's silence is a product of adult males' monopoly
on entitlement. For West, "[tihe massive production of 'unentitled
silence' regarding female sexual violation stands in marked contrast to
the near-manic production of a 'discourse' on male sexual pleasure so
carefully documented by Foucault."' This production differential can
be traced to men's monopoly of the sense of entitlement. For example,
using a bit of text by Florence Rush, West argues that it is women and
children who are unentitled:
Why is it that children who have been molested, sexually abused, or even raped
rarely or never tell? They never tell for the same reason that anyone who has
been helplessly shamed and humiliated, and who is without protection or valida-
tion of personal integrity, prefers silence. Like the woman who has been raped,
the violated child may not be believed... her injury may be minimized. . . ,and
she may even be held accountable for the crime.'"
Fourth, modem women's silence is abetted by superior male time,
facilities, and energy. Men are imaged as possessed of the means to dis-
course: "Women are silent because we do not have the time, the atomis-
tic self-possession, the luxury or the rooms of our own in which to
speak."" Men are free of certain distractions and debilitations, while
for women "[tihere are too many dishes... , too much laundry, too
many children, too many cares, too many problems. Without more
help-a great deal of help-there is just too much of this non-lingual, de-
184. West, supra note 164, at 69.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 69-70. The testimony originally appeared in Catherine Weiss & Louise
Mellng, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L REV. 1299, 1333 (1988).
187. West, supra note 164, at 70.
188. Id. (quoting Florence Rush, Foreword, in I NEVER TOLD ANYONE 13 (Bass &
Thornton eds., 1983)).
189. Id.
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manding domestic world for women" to overcome." °
West's fifth and final reason for the production of modem women's
silence-it is the self-reproducing effect of women's silence--might seem
to be only indirectly related to male situatedness or causation. However,
the opposite is true: "Masculine discourse dominates the conversational
space, thus generating male social constructs that in turn further
women's silence."' More particularly, women's self-reproduced silence
exists as a product of patriarchal violence (identified with men and their
discourse in the following text):
[S]o long as women and children remain overwhelmingly silent in the name of
overpowering violence, if we want to understand the contours of our oppression,
we will have to come to grips with our forced, coerced or collaborative silence,
and not (only) with their developed and contradictory and oppressie discursive
practices. And when we understand women's silence, we will have a better under-
standing not only of patriarchy, but of men's discourse, of men's discursive prac-
tices and of masculine subjectivity as well.'"
As causative of women's silence, patriarchal violence and discursive
epistemology are also closely allied with male sexuality. West states:
While we discourse endlessly on the pleasure of sex so central to masculine sexu-
ality-whether to condemn it, censor it, praise it, analyze it, understand it,
rechannel it, repress it or simply indulge it-we still speak almost not at all of the
violence of sex so central to childhood and femininity.'"
Discourse and patriarchy are implicated as the root causes of silence:
Surely we need to understand not only the speaking (male) sexuality and its pos-
sessor, the subjective (male) self created by all our discourse on sexuality, but
also the silence of the objective (female) being, also "created" by both the sexual-
ized discourse and the patriarchal power behind it. We need, in other words, to
understand the modem societal inclination to keep [women and children] si-
lent.'"
3. The Self
West emphasizes that both critical social theorists and feminist theo-
rists have exposed the "liberal self' as a construct. She claims these
theorists do differ critical theorists maintain that the liberal self is a
social construct, "defined and produced by a liberal-cultural understand-
190. Id. at 71.
191. Id. at 72.
192. Id. at 78.
193. Id. at 74.
194. Id. at 75.
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ing,"' while feminists stress that it "is a gendered construct, both
bound and produced by masculine, patriarchal and, to some degree, mi-
sogynist experience.""'
West concentrates on what she claims is a deeper difference between
critical social theory and feminism on the subject of the self. She dis-
cerns a tension between "feminist interpretations of women's experienc-
es," and "the social theorist's claim that not just the particular liberal
self, but virtually every possible description of the nature of the self, is a
social construct."" As she states: "Now the question I want to pose is
whether this universal claim-that any description of a concrete, given,
natural, precultural self is delusional... is an accurate account of
women's inner lives. It may, of course, be true of men but not of wom-
en."'"
West's answer is that the universal claim is not true of women. She
claims to base her answer on the developing body of women's self-ac-
counts and feminist research into female interiority. However, West's
discernment of the deep difference between the critics and the feminists
is just as dependent on her own view of the masculine self.
For example, her discussion of the limits of the universal claim con-
tains her own important conclusion that the male self is opposite to the
female self. Specifically, West views the male self as constructed and the
female self as natural, a split that echoes her discussion elsewhere in
Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law of natural female morality
and non-natural, discursive male morality.'" The constructedness of the
male self is one of the reasons the critical theorists insist on the univer-
sality of the constructed self.'a West most commonly speaks of the
constructed male self by implication, when discoursing on the non-con-
structed female self:
[W]e should be extremely wary of the postmodern, poststructuralist and social-
theoretic claim that this non-discursive, woman-bonded, creative, erotic, and quiet-
ly rebellious self within is but another product of a political, patriarchal, liberal
and societal discourse. We should instead seek to protect and nurture and give
voice to that most tentative, intuitive, unschooled and above all else undisciplined
female self that lies within."'
195. IL at 86.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id,
199. See infra notes 209-29 and accompanying text.
200. The other reason is the "truth" of the female self: "What of this selfl-this
woman-bonded, creative, playfully erotic, loving, unspeakable and negative female
self9.... The social theorist is concerned with discursive truths, and the truth of this
female self is by definition that which is unspeakable." West, supra note 164, at 95-96.
201. Id. at 96.
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The following passage would indicate that among the gendered selves,
the male self is constructed because it,, and only it, lies within discourse:
[F]eminists should not conclude from [the] discursive exclusion of the female self
that we have discovered yet another socially constructed and ultimately nonexis-
tent self which should be banished from all thought, dreams and histories. WE
SHOULD CONCLUDE THAT WE HAVE DISCOVERED THE LOGICAL LIMITS OF
THE DISCURSIVE OBJECT OF SOCIAL THEORETIC UNDERSTANDING. =
West also directly images the male self as constructed. For example,
"[w]omen's folk lore, consciousness-raising sessions and conversations
are replete with recountings of the sheer time and energy expended in
the never-ending and enormous female task of maintaining the male's
masculine sense of self."' Such direct imagery is vastly exceeded by
indirect imagery, however. West obliquely images the male self in all but
the last formulation already displayed. This practice continues in other
formulations, such as the "uncultured, natural, loving, female self,"'
and that self's non-constructed, extant, natural meaning: "It is that self
who can show us how to create a safe world without killing the sponta-
neous, the physical, the natural, the unpredictable and the pleasur-
able.""
4. Morality
Emphasizing Roberto Unger, West holds that the formulation "power
and its distributions exhaust the moral universe" is one of critical social
theory's main tenets." Specifically, "[tihe critic's utopia.., is a world
in which the power to break free of the false necessity created by institu-
tional and imaginative constructs is as widely distributed as possible."'
Freedom requires weakening the script that has written (and maintains)
these hierarchizing constructs. Further, Unger "urges the
'denaturalization' of society, which is synonymous with the emancipation
of society from social roles girded by false claims of necessity."'
West identifies three problems with this Ungerian notion that, as she
202. Id. (emphasis added).
203. Id at 88.
204. Id. at 95.
205. Id. at 96.
206. Id. at 78.
207. Id. at 78-79.
208. Id. (citation omitted).
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puts it, "the end of hierarchy is... the necessary root of morality."'
This three-part argument features a crucial andric image in which men
are likened to non-nature. To advance her critique, West runs a dichoto-
my in which women are identified with nature or natural processes
(chiefly birthing), and men with non-nature or non-natural processes
(chiefly discourse).
In the first part of her argument, West claims that oppression is an
avoidable "consequence of inequality and hierarchy."21 ° Her case in
point is the relationship of mother and infant: "The physically unequal
mother in all cultures typically breast feeds and protects, rather than
bullies or browbeats, the vulnerable infant and child. The powerful moth-
er nurtures so as to give life and create growth in the weak. She does
not impose so as to inscribe her will.""' This observation debunks criti-
cal social theory's views of power and morality:
If feminists are right to theorize and women are right to experience a respectful,
nurturant, caring response that aims to promote rather than dominate the interest
and well-being of the weaker "other' as one possible product of hierarchical rela-
tions, then the Ungerian descriptive claim that a dominating, positing and delimit-
ing power is the only product of hierarchy, and the moral claim that the destruc-
tion of hierarchy is the only intelligible political goal, are simply wrong.2
1
2
Finally, the example of the mother-infant relationship shows that ame-
liorating all hierarchical relationships requires only the infusion of care
and not "false claims of equality, objectivity or a distanced and alienated
respect, nor with levers by which the hierarchy can be smashed.""3
These claims are grounded in an identification of women with nature
and men with artificiality. The identification of women with nature is
basic and unremarkable. Mothers' nurturant response to hierarchical
advantage constitutes a "physical fact[] of life.""' Women may be right
"to trust [their] nurturant response within the natural inequality of the
mother-infant relationship.""' Breast feeding forms part of the possible
grounding of a moral theory that rejects "Enlightenment ideals of ratio-
nality and objectivity" as well as "post-enlightenment glorification of
power."2
1
6
Further, West associates men with discourse, and images discourse as
209. 1d. at 80.
210. Id.
211. Id,
212. Id at 81.
213. Id
214. Id. at 80.
215. Id. at 81.
216. Id. at 80-81.
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antithetical to nature.1 7 Unger, West wrote, portrays "a world in which
'nature' is there to be denigrated, conquered, transcended and exploited,
and it is a world in which passion creates not the basis of moral life, but
hierarchical ties to be broken.""' By "nature," West seemingly meant
the non-discursive and passionate basis of primarily female existence
because the next sentence counsels distrust of claims "that defmitionally
exclude the emotional and subjective root of many women's, and more
than a few men's, aspirational and moral lives.""9
West continues to rely on gender as she criticizes the critical social
theorist's claim that all is discourse, that human ideals exist only in our
"uttered imaginings."m To West, the truth of such a view is belied by
the fact that "[f]or many women, moral inclinations are neither reflected
nor embodied in our modem discursive practices-any of them. " "
Women's moral lives, West believes, are "rooted in our earliest, pre-ver-
bal experiences of being loved and nurtured."' Furthermore, this
women's reality is a "natural experience."'
West's genderization of the distinct realms of non-verbal and verbal, as
well as her opposition of verbal and natural, is apparent in the following
passage:
We might conclude that moral ideals and moral inclinations derive from the quiet
love of the mother, rather than from the discursive guidance of the father. We
might conclude that the root of moral life and experience is profoundly non- and
pre-verbal .... We will not do so if we acquiesce to the Ungerian insistence that
we focus our idealistic and historical gaze on the verbal spheres of our "denatural-
ized" existence.'
West's third and final reason for criticizing Ungerian morality starkly
illustrates her association of women and their interests with nature and
men with non-nature. This association is prefaced with an admonition.
According to West, "[fleminists and feminist legal theorists... should
also be extremely wary of the profound devaluation of nature, the denial
of the significance of the natural realm and the disregard and contempt
for natural constraints and natural truths that play such a prominent role
217. Id.
218. Id. at 81.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 82.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id
1031
in Unger's critique of traditional morality."'
This devaluation of nature was troublesome to West, in part because
"it characterizes the history of patriarchal culture, at least from the Re-
naissance to the present."'m The woman-nature connection is coordinat-
ed with the iniquitous past and the hope for the future: "The oppression
of women and the exploitation of nature have been constant companions
in the story of patriarchy; by correlation, as numerous feminists have in-
sisted, respect for nature and respect for women must play convergent
roles in the story of our mutual liberation.""T
The connection between women and nature, however, is more than a
function of patriarchal history. Rather, it is at the heart of West's defini-
tion of women. West insisted that feminist legal theorists should "remem-
ber, remain true to, and draw upon, the naturalism and quietness that
have always been central to what has been and is still most admirable
about women's moral lives. "
West does introduce a partial qualification of her dichotomous render-
ing of men and women:
There is surely no way to know with any certainty whether women have a privi-
leged access to a way of life that is more nurturant, more connected, more natu-
ral, more loving and thereby more moral than the principled lives which both men
and women presently pursue in the public sphere... [b]ut it does seem that
whether by reason of sociological role, psychological upbringing or biology, wom-
en are closer to such a life: If it is but a memory, then for women it is a more
vivid memory; if it is a utopian dream, then for women it is a dream we have
never fully denied and from which we routinely draw sustenance and guid-
ance.'
However, even taken by itself, the qualification is only a recognition of
uncertainty. It also seems to conflict with nearly all of her statements
about men, women, nature, and non-nature in this section of Feminism,
Critical Social Theory and Law. Contrary to the spirit of her closure in
this section, West advises against women self-censoring because of "a
Nietzschean power ideology now fashionable among critical legal schol-
ars. "M "[It] not only threatens to silence once again what is most dis-
tinctive in [women's] voice, but is also steeped, far more than the liberal
theory against which it defines itself, in a covert and overt contempt for
women, feminism, nature, the natural realm and the feminine. " "
225. ld,
226. Id. at 83.
227. Ld. (footnote omitted).
228. Id. West also speaks of 'remembrances of a feminine and feminist closeness to
nature." Id. at 97.
229. Id,
230. 1d at 84.
231. Id. For a group of passages in which West explicitly identifies critical theory
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5. Conclusion
This text contains an incredibly myriad and complex use of gendered
and andric imagery. In Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, Rob-
in West uses a very large number of generalized statements about men,
male and masculine in her various arguments.
West not only peppers this text with generalizations about men; this
section demonstrates that her themes and claims are based on them.
This demonstration has been done by closely reading the themes and
claims and by presenting the supporting andric imagery. However, as a
general cap to this incremental textual analysis of Feminism, Critical
Social Theory and Law, it is valid to say that this quantity of andric im-
agery has to constitute more than jettisonable window-dressing.
Even so, West's andric imagery is unacknowledged. Although her use
of generalizations about men in her various arguments is obvious, West
never acknowledges either a critical or multifarious role played by her
conceptions of men, male, and masculine.
It may be possible to boil down West's myriad andric imagery in Femi-
nism, Critical Social Theory and Law into two general types. The first
type, which is very prominent in her discussion of power and knowledge,
can be sumnmarized as follows: men do not understand what women are
and act on women in destructive ways. Because of their ignorance and
their monopoly of certain essential aspects of life, they have a de-
structive effect on women. More concretely, because the male critical
theorists do not know women, they do not recognize that power is not
just productive; because males have monopolized knowledge and have
defined it as discourse, they have turned women's knowledge into si-
lence.
West's second general andric image in this text is much more closely
aligned with a picture of what men actually are to her. In her discussions
of the self and morality, she images men as constructed or non-natural.
Because men are at least less natural than women, those among them
who have developed critical social theory have (1) promulgated a discur-
sive, gendered idea of the human self that is not true of women and (2)
perpetuated the notion that hierarchy is unnatural, immoral, coercive,
and otherwise negative.
with "male," see supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
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B. Andric Imagery in The Feminine Silence
The moral nature was seldom out of keeping with the physical make.
-Melville, Billy Budd, Sailor
In The Feminine Silence: A Response to Professor Koffler, West coun-
ters Judith Koffler's claim that "femininity is banished" from Billy Budd:
Sailor (a story without female characters),' except that Melville invest-
ed the title character with "erotic femininity."m West claims that Billy
Budd is feminine in three other respects. First, "Billy embodies feminine
virtue," in that "Billy is a peacemaker... inspir[ing] men toward
peace... not through force, but through beauty, grace, and love."'
Second, "Billy's silence is feminine... [t]hat silence is profoundly, tragi-
cally, feminine." Third, he is "through and through a victim, and that
victimization is profoundly feminine. " '
West's claims are strongly rooted in pejorative andric imagery. Her
explanations of these claims illustrate that West's interpretation of Billy
Budd rests on the following simple dichotomy: negativity is rendered as
masculine, positivity as feminine. West identifies "the feminine" in a short
novel featuring only male characters by assigning valorous femininity to
the most sympathetic of them. She identifies "the masculine" as negative
by both directly characterizing it as such and assigning it to other, less
sympathetic principle characters.
1. The Feminine Victim and the Masculine Victimizer
Addressing her last claim first, West states that Billy Budd is a valor-
ous and innocent feminine victim. She emphasizes that, like women, Billy
is attacked by and, in response, kills someone "with whom he lives in
relatively close quarters." " Billy is first victimized by Claggart, the at-
tacking, abusive ship's master-at-arms. He is then victimized by Captain
Vere, who presides over the court-martial that condemns Billy to death
for killing Claggart: "Like Billy, abused women and children who kill
their abusers kill in self-defense, and like Billy Budd, they are for that
reason legally as well as morally innocent. As with Billy, to convict them
232. Judith Koffler, Billy Budd: The Feminine Presence, 1 CARDOZO STUDIES IN L AND
LITERATURE 1 (1989).
233. West, supra note 167, at 16.
234. ld. at 17.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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is legally wrong as well as morally criminal.'r
As a complement to her characterization of Billy, West masculinizes
his victimizers. Claggart -is comparatively unimportant; he is mentioned
only in passing to complete the domestic violence analogy.' Vere is
much more prominent and significant. For example, West's strict and
negativizing masculinization of this character inflects her condemnation
of Billy's punishment:
Maybe a female Vere would honor the feminine, as well as hear it. Maybe, to be
precise, Billy's case would have come out the other way. And maybe, if it had, the
result would have been more just That is: it might be because Vere banishes the
feminine voice that the masculine Vere commits such a grave ijustice.'
She wonders whether Billy "was done in... by the smallness of Vere's
stunted, de-feminized spirit."'"
The pronounced masculinity of West's Vere serves to condemn not
only the result in Billy's court-martial, but also law in general. She claims
uncertainty as to whether a female Vere--or one who did not "banish[]
the feminine voice" -would have made a difference.' However, she
is certain
that women's presence and women's voice in the law, in government, in the mili-
tary, and in military law will make a difference-a real difference-to Billy Budd,
to the outcome of cases, to the quality of justice, to the administration of the
Articles of War, to the interpretation of statutes and constitutions, and to the
meaning of the Rule of Law.'
She is also rather certain that a female or feminine Vere would have
been more merciful, as the following rhetorical question makes clear.
"Would a female Vere suggest to female officers that they must vanquish
the feminine, silence the feminine voice, and subordinate female compas-
sion, kindness, and maternal care to masculine, paternal, and patriarchalduty?."
238. Id. at 18.
239. Id. at 17.
240. Id. at 16.
241. Id. at 18.
242. Id. at 16.
243. Id. at 15-16.
244. Id. at 16 (footnote omitted).
245. Id. at 15. This quotation also nicely encapsulates West's affirmation of feminine
and concomitant denigration of masculine.
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2. Feminine Silence and Feminine Virtue
West "comment[s] much more briefly on Billy's feminine silence and
feminine virtue."'. She notes that Billy remains silent as his world
crashes down on him and that Melville introduces the character by em-
phasizing his peacemaking skills. West melds her feminine-ascribing
treatment of these together because "Billy's womanly virtue and even
more womanly silence is interesting. [This is because his] womanly si-
lence renders his womanly virtue totally mysterious. " "
In discussing Billy's feminine silence and feminine peacemaking, West
focuses on the connection between women's silence and their nonopera-
tive virtue of peacemaking:
If women's moral voice is truly different-more loving, more caring, more
peaceful, than men's-as Prof. Gilligan and many others now argue-then per-
haps, if only it could be heard, that voice would make a difference. Perhaps our
conflict-ridden history is itself, in part, a function of women's silence. If women's
morality is really different, and if women are truly silent, then it is time for wom-
en to break that silence.'
Her discussion of this connection between feminine silence and femi-
nine virtue is dependent on a strict dichotomization of masculine and
feminine that denigrates the former and valorizes the latter. Her gender
dichotomization here is as crucial and strong as in her discussion of Billy
as a feminine victim.
It is clear from The Feminine Silence that West does not find "woman-
ly virtue" to be "totally mysterious." She is actually certain that "women's
morality is really different" and better. She characterizes women and
men without qualification. For example, "[w]e [women] reject the
claimed necessity of a violent root of human association." 9 Elsewhere,
she maintains that "[iln the interest of accuracy, women's moral voice
seems to be distinctively tied to the moral value of empathy."'m Her at-
titude toward the morality difference is clear from her gender
dichotomization of Billy and Vere: "[Billy's] feminine virtue, his morality,
and his talent for waging peace all stand in stark contrast to Vere's prin-
246. Id. at 18.
247. Id.
248. Id (citation omitted).
249. Id. at 19.
250. West, supra note 168, at 867 n.2. Many other examples from her writings could
be offered. Here is a single sample: "[W]omen do not struggle toward connection with
others, against which turn out to be insurmountable obstacles. Intimacy is not some-
thing which women fight to be capable of. We just do it. It is ridiculously easy. It is
also, I suspect, qualitatively beyond the pale of male effort." West, supra note 167, at
40.
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cipled morality, his masculine virtue, and his talent for waging a just
war.
" 251
West is also confident that women are silent and need to speak their
different and better morality. They are possessed of the "feminine ethic,"
which "pushes women... to see [their] idealized selves as peacemak-
ers."M Because he keeps silent, the feminine "Billy -again like innumer-
able women-fails as a peace-wager."' West feels that "[t]he bottom
line for women is just this. Women must break this silence."' This im-
perative arises from male disability; men in general, as well as "the men
in Billy Budd... cannot love one another."' It is up to women to end
this situation: "But if we are to be more effective than was Billy in show-
ing these men how to love one another-and if we are to avoid getting
hanged in the process-then, unlike Billy, we must break our silence."'
3. Conclusion
West's identification of a feminine character in Billy Budd-as well as
her related claims about women and men-rests on an uncompromising
association of masculine with negativity. Billy is a feminine victim, a
victim of masculine cruelty and stuntedness. Billy is also a symbol of
women's silent virtue (which, if expressed and heard, would counteract
male disability). The association of masculine with negativity, deficiency,
and inferiority in this text is uncompromising.
The main problem with The Feminine Silence, however, is not West's
facile gender dichotomizing, the misandric mantra that springs off the
page. Instead, it is that her article may provide an example of the limits
of feminist literary criticism. As an interpretation of Billy Budd, West's
text is perhaps a very clear example of the limiting imposition of simple
gender imagery on a complicated literary work. To the extent that West
wants a reappraisal of Billy Budd, her imposition works a reductive
distortion in which the reader is asked to substitute West's gender cer-
tainties for a short but complex novel.
251. Supra note 167, at 17.
252. Id. at 19.
253. 1&
254. UL
255. Id.
256. 1& at 19-20.
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C. Andric Imagery in Economic Man and Literary Woman
In Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast,2s West con-
trasts characteristics of "economic man" that have been developed in
economic legal analysis with characteristics of "literary person" or "liter-
ary woman" that have been developed in literary legal analysis. Her con-
trast is based on a set of her own generalizing gender oppositions
that-as in The Feminine Silence-are rife with disparaging andric imag-
ery. However, Economic Man and Literary Woman features a somewhat
different set of oppositions.
1. The Distinct Genders of the Economic and Literary Humans
This set of oppositions is expressed in the two main stages of the
article: her definitional contrast between economic man and literary
woman, and the latter's distinct moral promise.
The basic definitional contrast is simple. According to West, the claims
on behalf of economic man-that (1) we know what is best for ourselves
and invariably seek it, and (2) we are "incapable of empathic knowledge
regarding the subjective well-being of others" -are belied by the lack
of self-knowledge and self-motivation, as well as the empathic strength of
literary woman.m She is defined as this lack and this strength. Her mor-
al promise rests on her empathy, on the community-building and
intersubjective understanding of which she is capable.' ° Thus, literary
woman "stands in sharp contrast to her closest interdisciplinary cousin,
economic man. " "
This article's primary attraction was not the possibility that West asso-
ciates men with rational maximizing and women with intersubjectivity.
Instead, this section will explore her contrast between the visions called
economic man and literary woman. In other words, the critique will
operate on the level of West's assignment of gender to two general hu-
man images, one of which (she claims) arises out of law and economics
and the other out of law and literature.'
The definitional contrast between economic man and literary woman
begins in the article's introduction. West states that it is, "of course,"
standard to refer to the "abstract character who has emerged from the
257. West, supra note 168.
258. Id. at 869.
259. 1d. at 868-73.
260. Id. at 873-78.
261. Id. at 868.
262. Id. at 867.
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economic analysis of law" as "economic man."' Also, "in the interest
of rough justice and somewhat in the interest of accuracy," the person
"emerg[ing) from literary legal analysis" can be referred to as "literary
woman.W"
The first step in West's definitional contrast-the assignment of gender
to these two general visions of "human being"-clearly is not inevita-
ble.' First, gendering the law and economics vision may only reflect
one's view of that school of thought. The image of humans as rational
maximizers of their own utility is claimed to be virtually universal by
proponents of law and economics.' This basic aspect is reflected in a
quotation from Richard Posner that West cites as she launches into her
description of economic man: "[Law and economics assumes] that people
are rational maximizers of their satisfactions .... Is it plausible to sup-
pose that people are rational only or mainly when they are transacting in
markets?"'7 Second, West herself acknowledges that her image of the
human vision emerging from law and literature may not be the most
representative of that school of thought.'
West's genderization of these visions provides the framework for her
contrast of them. Rendered as an opposite of "literary woman," "econom-
ic man" is constructed out of derogatory andric imagery.'
First, economic man's prime attribute, his "Herculean rationality," is a
conceit.' West characterizes economic man's claim as: "[hie knows his
263. Id. One might dispute the "standardness" of this genderization.
264. Id, "Rough justice" is explained as the inclusion of men in terms referring to
women. Id, at 867 n.2. Somewhat contradictorily, this same footnote states that "accu-
racy" means that "women's moral voice seems to be distinctively tied to the moral
value of empathy" and the "literary method of narrative" discussed in the article. Id.
West's text actually dichotomizes the genders, belying any such "rough justice."
265. See id at 867.
268. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976).
267. West, supra note 168, at 868 n.2. (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
JUSTICE 1-2 (1981)).
268. Id. at 867-68. West states that
I am not suggesting, and do not believe, that the comparative vision of liter-
ary woman that contrasts with economic man and which I will describe in
this essay is the only, or even the most, representative vision of humanity
and human nature that has emerged from the law and literature movement.
Id.
269. See id. at 868-81.
270. See id at 868.
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own subjective rationality and pursues it relentlessly."" ' This false
claim is exploded by the obviousness of our failures of self-knowl-
edge.m Herculean rationality is antipodal to literary woman's complexi-
ty: "[s]he does not know herself... [and] is sufficiently complex so that
as a character, she is worth portraying, and as a reader, she is worthy of
dialogue; she is educable."'
Second, this phony vision is potentially destructive. West states that, in
addition to the risk of losing "the literary vision of our humanity,"' it
is possible for us to become "the person posited as economic man." '
This would mean that we would be nonempathic; we would be "hard-
ened to others," and "unable to listen to, understand, or respond sympa-
thetically to the subjective anguish of others."' The reader does not
escape the gender-identification of the economic human: West warns
against "the egotistic danger of economic man. "2'
In marked contrast, literary woman's prime attribute is not a conceit.
Her "empathic ability is truly Herculean. " ' The literary woman is amaz-
ingly capable: "She has a virtually infinite ability to understand the sub-
jective being of the other, even where such empathic knowledge is most
difficult: of the person with the different racial heritage, the different
family history, the different intelligence, or the different ambitions, goals,
happifiess, and sorrow."m West's two examples of this literary type are
Toni Morrison'a and Patricia Williams."l
West's contrast of genders by employing strictly derogatory andric
imagery is also prominent in the second main portion of Economic Man
and Literary Woman, where West concentrates on the moral promise of
literary woman. This moral promise is exemplified by her "empathic
competence, which is not shared by economic man."' According to
West, "the literary woman achieves the empathic bridge in the hard case,
271. Id.
272. Id. West states that "[a]lthough economic man is perfectly rational with respect
to knowledge of his own subjective well-being, he is at the same time utterly incapable
of empathetic knowledge regarding the subjective well-being of others." Id. at 869.
273. Id. at 871.
274. West points out that the law and literature movement is "an important and even
vital interdisciplinary and critical perspective on law." Id. at 879.
275. Id. at 874.
276. Id. at 875.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 872.
279. Id. (footnote omitted).
280. Id. at 872 n.21 (citing TONI MORRISON, BELOVED).
-281. Id. (citing Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from
Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARv. LR.-C.L.L REv. 401 (1987)).
282. Id at 872.
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the means by which she gains access to the other's subjective life,
[through] metaphor and narrative."' Additionally, literary woman rep-
resents hope:
(Ulnilke economic man, she is... someone we can unabashedly claim that we
should become. She represents not just our cultural heritage, but more important-
ly (and relatedly) she represents our potential for moral growth. She is the possi-
bility within all of us for understanding, for empathy, for sympathy, and most
simply, for love.'
Sometimes West is gender-neutral in her description of the literary
type. For example, she writes, "We can fulfill the empathic promise of
the literary person rather than the egotistic danger of economic man. " is
However, the economic type is never rendered in gender-neutral terms
and the literary person is often gender identified. West begins the paper
by claiming that "women's moral voice seems to be distinctively tied to
the moral value of empathy.., and the literary method of narrative. " '
West's discussion of literary woman's moral promise features an andric
image of incapacity." She claims that empathy is often hard to achieve,
particularly "when the experience with which we are trying to empathize
is one that we have never experienced ourselves, and even one that we
could never experience ourselves.' Her only "examples" of such em-
pathic or intersubjective disability to mention gender complement her
view of women's unique moral voice and male disability. For example,
"[lit is very difficult for a white man to empathically grasp the magnitude
or nature of the pain of being the only woman or black on a law facul-
ty."s
283. 1L at 873-74.
284. ld. at 878 (footnote omitted).
285. 1d. at 875 (emphasis added).
286. Ld, at 867 n.2 (citing Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and The Feminine Voice in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L REv. 543 (1986); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFER-
ENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982)).
287. See id. at 873-77.
288. Id. at 873 (footnote omitted).
289. Id. As another example:
The adamant refusal of the "white male heavies" in the critical legal studies
movement (as elsewhere) to come to grips with this deceptively simple point
is the reason, plain and simple, that so many women, people of color, gays,
lesbians, and other "different" and differently oppressed groups are enraged
by the internal dynamics of the movement.
Id. at 873 n.23.
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2. Conclusion
The andric images in this text are strictly derogatory. However, the
purpose here has been to demonstrate West's gender contrast and its
centrality to her claims about the relative merits of the "economic" and
"literary" versions of the human being. Her ascription of gender to the
differing visions of "human being" that she claims exist in the economic
and literary schools of legal thought is complemented by a strict dichoto-
my of gender traits. This dichotomy, furthermore, is the clear grounding
of her contrast between the visions of "human being" she discerns in the
two schools. Gendering these visions is not inevitable, but West's han-
dling of the differences between them as well as the moral promise of
the literary species is clearly heavily dependent on the lens of gender,
from the use of pronouns to substantive pictures of gendered traits.
VII. FRANCES OLSEN
This essay's discussion of critical andric imagery in Fran Olsen's work
is focused on a single article, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of
Rights Analysis.'s This article is unique among her published pieces
because it is the only article containing crucial andric imagery."
In Statutory Rape, Olsen claims to add to the debate over rights analy-
sis and sexuality' out of two motivations:
This Article... uses statutory rape laws to examine rights analysis and the cri-
tique of rights in a concrete context and to evaluate the relevance of both to
women's struggles. I have chosen this example for two reasons: first, statutory
rape laws raise in a rich context issues of equal protection, paternalistic protec-
tion, sexuality, and privacy; second, the Supreme Court upheld a gender-based
statutory rape provision three years ago in Michael M. v. Superior Court,' a de-
290. Frances Oisen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx.
L REV. 387 (1984).
291. Apart from this article, Olsen does not place much emphasis on generalizing as-
sertions about men. Oisen does, however, indulge in occasional blanket assertions
about men in her other writings. For example:
For men, the family is a realm in which they can expose their "weaknesses,"
in which they may embrace without shame the values traditionally associated
with women. By relating with women in families, men try to, reclaim whole-
ness. Second, the family is a realm in which men can be bosses. In their
families men can express competitive, values and other values traditionally
considered masculine. Men may be compensated in the family for their fail-
ures in the marketplace. The home is a haven for men.
Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARv. L REV. 1497, 1565 (1983).
292. Olsen, supra note 290, at 390.
293. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
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cision that has generated a good deal of scholarly comment'
Olsen's various conclusions about rights analysis and sexuality are
grounded in an image of male heterosexuality as pervasively predatory
and coercive.' In fact, this pejorative, sexualized andric image is cru-
cially present in her discussion of both rights and statutory rape laws, as
well as the result in Michael M. v. Superior Court.' In other words, far
from being merely one of the issues raised by statutory rape laws,
Olsen's text makes it clear that sexuality (of the straight male variety) is
the issue.2
Olsen's text also makes it clear why her characterization of male sexu-
ality-and not a position on the battleground of rights-forms the basis
for her discussion of statutory rape laws:
Some of the proposed changes in statutory rape laws are better than others. It is
even possible that most feminists would agree on the best change. But this agree-
ment would not be reached by discovering the "real" meaning of women's rights
or by logically deducing the "true implications" of gender equality. Rather, it
would rest upon sociological calculations and political and moral commitments.
An abstract commitment to women's rights does not help us decide concrete cas-
es.m
The argument in the next section supports the idea that the desire for
feminist agreement rests upon seeking feminist acceptance of the "socio-
logical calculation" that male heterosexuality is unqualifiedly negative.'
This pejorative image of male heterosexuality is the foundation of Olsen's
thesis.
A. The Pejorative Image of Male Heterosexuality
In Statutory Rape, Olsen is mostly critical of rights analysis." She
begins her critique on the most general level, pointing to past demonstra-
tions of the contradictions and indeterminacy of rights theories. °'
Rights thinking also has a negative impact on thinking about sexuality:
[T]hinldng in terms of rights encourages a partial and inadequate analysis of sexu-,
294. Olsen, supra note 290, at 390 (footnote omitted).
295. See id. at 390-401.
296. See il at 390-429.
297. See Ul. at 429-32.
298. Id. at 412.
299. See infra notes 300-334 and accompanying text.
300. See Olsen, supra note 290, at 390-401.
301. Id. at 387-89 (footnotes omitted).
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ality... it conceptualizes the problem of sexuality as a question of where social
controls should end and sexual freedom should begin... . The important issue,
however, is not where to draw such a line, but the substance and meaning that
we give to sexuality.'
Olsen, however, has many good things to say about rights. For exam-
ple, "[t]he claim that women have rights... [as a description] expresses
a set of established social practices that are fairly decent for women." '
Such a claim also "is a way for a woman to make a claim about herself
and her role in the world."' "[R]ights for women... may be necessary
and should be supported."'
In contrast, her detailed treatment of rights, sexuality, and statutory
rape law features a single, condemnatory view of male heterosexuality as
predatory.' Her examination of rights analysis in the context of statu-
tory rape laws-a regulation of sexual conduct-is constantly and struc-
turally related to her characterization of the meaning and practices of
male heterosexuals.'
This definite and constant image of male heterosexuality as coercive
and aggressive fuels the thematics of the piece." Whether Olsen is dis-
cussing various formulations of basic rights that women might assert,"
the general historical and current feminist take on statutory rape
laws,"'° a number of posited rape law devices for improving women's
lot, " ' the result in Michael M.,"1' or a new feminist jurisprudence cen-
302. Id. at 389.
303. Id, at 390-91.
304. Id at 391.
305. 1d at 394.
306. This Article makes no claim regarding Olsen's statements about male heterosex-
uality, other than that they are important and structurally supportive of her article's
main themes.
307. Olsen never uses the word "heterosexual." Her typical formulations do not break
down "male sexual" into homosexual or heterosexual types. However, because she is
only concerned with male sexual practices regarding women, it is logical to assume
she means only male heterosexuality.
308. Olsen offers only "occasional moments of escape:"
Friends have argued to me that men are often confused about when women
are or are not receptive to them and that what I characterize as men's ef-
forts to force community upon women is at least a step away from alienated
isolation. To the contrary, I would suggest that the expectation of access to
women by men is part and parcel of our alienated existence .... None of
what I say is intended to deny, however, the occasional moments of escape
from alienation that individuals experience as a glimpse of new possibilities.
Such moments do occur (even between men and women) and they can be
wonderful.
Olsen, supra note 290, at 394 n.23.
309. Id. at 390-401.
310. Id. at 401-06.
311. Id. at 406-13.
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tered on sexual thinking and practice,"' she employs this picture of cur-
rent male heterosexuality.,"' This Article discusses each position, dem-
onstrating the versatile thematic centrality of Olsen's pejorative image of
male heterosexual practices.
1. Rights and the Critique of Rights
Olsen's discussion of rights and the critique of rights, as both apply to
women's sexual situation, makes crucial use of an image of illegitimate
and aggressive male sexual conduct. The image supports her claim that
rights and the critique of rights are valid and problematic for feminism,
depending on context."' For example, in discussing women's right to
autonomy, Olsen valorizes rights using such an image: "Men force com-
munity upon women when they make sexual advances to coworkers and
subordinates or pester women strangers with unwelcomed conversations.
A rapist may believe he is seeking community with his victim, especially
if she is his wife or social friend.""6 Further, the image is crucial: "[t]he
women's 'rights' that we should support are an expression of the social
practice of allowing women to resist forced community."31 7
2. Feminism and Statutory Rape Laws, Generally
Olsen's general discussion of feminism and statutory rape laws also
features the pejorative image of male heterosexuality. In this section, she
purports only to adumbrate the various positions taken by feminists past
and present on statutory rape laws, chiefly (1) nineteenth-century
feminists' general support for such laws out of protective motives and
(2) her statement of the two contemporary feminist criticisms of such
laws: "that they restrict women and that they reinforce sexist stereo-
312. Id. at 413-29.
313. Id, at 429-32.
314. To use a concept from rhetoric, her combinatory use of the word "male," forms
of the word "sexual," and forms of the word "aggression" (as well as analogous termi-
nology in various combinations), can be called the use of a "commonplace." A "com-
monplace" is a "classical rhetorical term for a set-piece of discourse repeatable in a
variety of situations." Condit, supra note 88, at 227. See also supra note 89 for
Condit's basic definition of "presence," another helpful rhetoric concept.
315. Olsen, supra note 290, at 388.
316. Id at 393.
317. Id.
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types."318
According to Olsen, nineteenth-century feminists conceived of male
sexuality as actually and not stereotypically aggressive."' Also, this
"nineteenth century concern with oppressive male initiative was replaced
in the mid-twentieth century by concern with state repression of sexuali-
ty."32
0
Her own sympathies turn out to be with the ancients, not the modems.
Resonating with her earlier discussion of forced community and
presaging her discussion of Michael M., Olsen rejects the more recent
concern with stereotype-weakening and state repression, and echoes the
nineteenth-century protectionists:
It can be argued that the [statutory rape] statutes legitimate the pervasive reality
of male sexual aggression by attempting to police a border between "good" shared
sex and "bad" coercive sex. In fact, there is no clear distinction; the exploitative
content of so much sexuality in our society pervades all of its forms."
3. Addressing Feminist Concerns Regarding Statutory Rape Laws
The pejorative, repetitive image is used in the next section of the arti-
cle, where Olsen discusses a number of devices that might address con-
temporary feminist concerns that statutory rape laws limit women sexu-
ally and reinforce stereotypes.' First, there are two ways in which
such laws could be changed to "free young women from state-enforced
sexual constraint": (1) such laws could be abolished, or (2) such women
could be given the decision whether or not to prosecute.'
The first option is addressed with the image of destructively aggressive
male heterosexuality. Olsen rejects abolition on the explicit and single
ground that it would expose young women to the systemic private op-
pression faced by adult women.' This oppression is the result of struc-
tural societal conditions and private aggressive action: "Adult women
occupy a position of pervasive economic and social subordination to
men. Adult women are seduced, pressured, coerced, and even forced into
unwanted sexual relations, for which they have no legal recourse."'
Olsen's list of possible avenues to reduce the damaging stereotype of
318. Id, at 402.
319. Id. at 403-04.
320. Id. at 404.
321. Id, at 402 n.71.
322. Id. at 404-06.
323. Id. at 406-10.
324. Id. at 406-07.
325. Id. (footnote omitted). Olsen's use of the passive voice in the second sentence
does not disguise the actors.
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helpless victimhood implicit in statutory rape laws likewise includes the
image of destructive, aggressive male heterosexuality in crucial ways. For
example, abolition is again problematic because it would "allow[] more
young women to be victimized by male aggression.'
The second avenue is more effective enforcement of current statutory
rape laws.' This avenue is interesting because Olsen-for the first time
in the article-directly refers to male sexual aggression as a "stereo-
type. However, the following adjacent paragraphs-her whole discus-
sion of this avenue-illustrate her actual view that male sexual aggres-
sion is importantly real, and not a false but common ascription:
If it were possible to enforce or revise statutory rape laws so that they actually
prevented men from victimizing women, the stereotypes might become so false
that they would lose their power. This approach implies significant risks, how-
ever. Legal reform may be insufficient to prevent victimization; laws alone seldom
change behavior. Moreover, in our present society, it may be impossible to em-
power women without stigmatizing them.
In a sense, this second approach is the converse of [abolition]. [Abolition]
would undermine the stereotype of men as aggressors and women as victims but
allow the reality; the second would support the stereotype but undermine the
reality.w
These passages construe aggressive male heterosexuality as real and
law-immune. As to the second paragraph, it is clear that Olsen believes
that sexual stereotype and sexual reality occupy separate spheres. The
reality of men as aggressors would be allowed by abolition and would be
undermined by effective enforcement or reform. The stereotype would be
affected in the opposite way. The first paragraph both places victimizing
male sexuality in an at least intermediate causal position and denies that
enforcement or reform could stop male aggression ("laws alone seldom
change behavior").
The third avenue would reduce stigma to underage women by extend-
ing the protection of statutory rape laws to underage males.' ° Olsen
problemizes this approach by pointing out that "it obscures the issue of
social power." This issue resolves itself into current sexual practices,
with male sexuality imaged as non-repressed and perhaps non-repress-
326. Id. at 410.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. ld. (footnotes omitted).
330. Id.
331. Id, at 411.
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ible:
Extending age-of-consent laws to males may effect merely a cosmetic change,
without altering images or practices under the law. Moreover, it leaves untouched
the repressive aspects of statutory rape laws. In our present society, these repres-
sive aspects hurt females more than males. Extension of the legal rule to males
might not bring extension of these repressive aspects.'
"Practices under the law" probably implies male sexual aggression,
given her objection to a fourth and final avenue, one that would "decrim-
inalize most sex between teen-agers but extend protection to minors of
both sexes against exploitation by an older person."' Olsen's criticism
of such a regime starkly and exclusively rests on her image of male het-
erosexuality: "Unfortunately, such a law would not address the problem
of male sexual aggression that characterizes'society at large. Underage
males are likely to relate to underage females in illegitimate ways, just as
their older counterparts relate to adult women in illegitimate ways.' 4
4. Michael M. v. Superior Court'
The image of pervasive, destructive, aggressive male heterosexuality
accompanies Olsen's treatment of Michael M. In that case, the U.S. Su-
preme Court narrowly rejected an equal protection challenge to a Califor-
nia law criminalizing sex with underage females, but not underage males.
Here, this Article will demonstrate how Olsen's theme of "pervasive male
sexual aggression" or "coercive male initiative" is present in her criticism
of each Supreme Court opinion in the case, as well as her treatment of
the reaction of feminist scholars to the case.
Olsen condemns the Michael M. case, "including the plurality, concur-
ring, and dissenting opinions," because it functions to "mask and legiti-
mate conditions of social existence that are hurtful and damaging to
women."' In each discussion of the underlying opinions, she reintro-
duces the image of hurtful and damaging male sexual aggression. Thus,
she asserts that Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion failed'to address
reasons behind use of statutory rape laws by underage women: "to pro-
tect themselves from male sexual aggression." T In Olsen's view, the
plurality's tacit acceptance of the underage woman's joint responsibility
was nonsensical because the laws exist "to protect females from male
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 412. Notice how 'illegitimate" is rendered as the likely basis of at least
underage males' relations with women.
335. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
336. Olsen, supra note 290, at 427.
337. Id at 414.
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sexual aggression."'
Justices Stewart and Blackmun each filed concurrences. Stewart
founded his resistance to Michael M.'s equal protection argument on the
fact that the statutory rape law in question did allow underage women to
be prosecuted for aiding and abetting their underage sexual activity.'
Olsen criticizes this as follows: "by treating the intercourse as a joint
wrongful act... [this] approach would discourage or disable women
from using statutory rape laws to protect themselves against aggressive
males."' She maintains that Blackmun expressed qualms about the
prosecution of Michael M. because of his dim view of the victim in the
case. His opinion "endorsed the double standard of sexual morality, un-
der which men may aggress against one class of females, but must leave
the 'higher' class chaste."NI
Justices Brennan (joined by White and Marshall) and Stevens each
filed dissenting opinions, maintaining that the statute discriminated
against men. Olsen rejects the dissenters' prescription for curing the fa-
cial discrimination of the statute by prosecuting underage women. If
such a regime existed, "[a] woman would find it more difficult to use
statutory rape laws as a shield against male aggression, even aggression
by men who are above the age of consent.' She views the dissenting
opinions as flawed, in that they tacitly include a positive view of current
male heterosexual practices:
The dissenters assume that the problem of sex discrimination can be solved with
tools and resources readily at our disposal, that sexual intercourse in our society
is an equal and joint act, and that no major or fundamental changes in our present
sexual arrangements are necessary. All of these assumptions are unjustified and
apologetic.'
The pejorative image of male heterosexuality also figures prominently
in Olsen's discussion of feminist reaction to Michael M. Much of this
portion of her article is a summary of Wendy Williams' discussion of the
case." Williams is represented as an example of the "liberal-legalist
338. Id,
339. 450 U.S. at 477 (Stewart, J., concurring).
340. Olsen, supra note 290, at 415.
341. Id
342. I at 420.
343. Id,
344. See Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts,
and Feminism, 8 WOMEN'S RS. L REP. 175 (1982).
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view of Michael M."' Williams "acknowledges that men are frequently
sexual aggressors," but nonetheless fails to "endorse laws addressing this
problem."' Ultimately, she fails to recognize "the cultural phenomenon
of coercive male initiative. " "7
These failures may be the result of Williams' liberal-legalist aversion to
gritty reality.' Olsen writes: "[Williams] assumes that to oppose male
sexual aggression we must refuse to acknowledge its existence." '
Olsen also feels that Williams' quibbling over the damaging aspects of
protectionist legislation is likewise a failure of clear sight: "I believe that
we should acknowledge the present reality of pervasive male sexual
aggression in our society and devise ways to change it rather than deny
it as an 'outmoded stereotype." °
Olsen also claims that Michael M. "has had a bad effect on feminist
political analysis. " " This bad effect is chiefly the obscuration of male
sexual aggression. For example, Olsen points out that some feminists
share the dissenters' view that "prosecuting young women will deter
them from becoming pregnant."' These feminists "do not consider
whether giving females more power to resist male aggression would
reduce the incidence of unwanted pregnancy.' The Court's "liberal-le-
galist" method also ensnares feminists into accepting "a mystification of
sexual intercourse," a false belief that heterosexual sex is an "equal in-
teraction."'
Olsen ends this section by resting her critique of the Michael M. deci-
sion on her image of male heterosexuality:
The decision in Michael M. did not have to mystify sexual intercourse or legiti-
mate the status quo. The case could have been an occasion to examine conditions
of sexuality in a society of gender hierarchy. Male sexual aggression could have
been exposed as oppressive and illegitimate. Michael's coercive male initiative
could have been generalized and delegitimated."'
The Court did not evince acceptance of Olsen's view of pervasive, preda-
345. Olsen, supra note 290, at 423.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 425 n. 184.
348. For a direct attack on the abstractions of liberal feminist legal theory using a
self-acknowledgedly foundational, extremely pejorative image of male sexuality, see
Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique
of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S U4. 81, 93-108 (1987).
349. Olsen, supra note 290, at 423-24.
350. Id. at 424.
351. Id. at 425.
352. I.
353. ld.
354. Id at 426.
355. dL at 428.
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tory, and aggressive male heterosexual practice. It did not show aware-
ness that "sex is usually to some extent imposed on females by
males.'
5. Male Heterosexuality and the New Feminist Jurisprudence
The article concludes with a proposal for a new direction in feminist
jurisprudence that will turn the focus away from squabbling over rights
to a "call for a reconstruction of sexuality altogether."" In this section,
Olsen includes her image of male heterosexuality in a summary of her
position on rights analysis of statutory rape laws:
Feminist rights analysis generally pretends that there are no differences between
men and women and attempts to advance women by giving them the rights men
have. The related attitude toward sexuality pretends that males are not sexually
aggressive and attempts to advance women by allowing them to participate in sex
as men do. Rights analysis is modified-though not basically changed-by femi-
nist arguments for special treatment. The sexual analogue to special treatment
recognizes males as aggressive but acts as though merely expanding social con-
trol, without changing the nature of social control, will provide a real answer.'
Feminists, Olsen claims, need to go beyond rights analysis ("liberal
legalism")." This would end the practice of pretending that males are
not aggressive and it might change the nature of social control by em-
powering women to use social control mechanisms to provide the real
answer to pervasive male sexual aggression. Feminists should focus ef-
forts on the reconstruction of sexuality, which is currently "a system
defined by and for men and designed in such a way that women are
silenced, terrorized, or both.'6
B. Conclusion
In Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, Fran
Olsen uses a repetitive and pejorative image of male heterosexuality as
the "sociological calculation"" that might lead to feminist agreement
on statutory rape law reforms. The sociological focus is mandated by,
inter alia, debilitating feminist division over legal rights analysis. If femi-
356. Id.
357. Id. at 430.
358. Id. at 429.
359. Id. at 430.
360. Id. at 431.
361. See supra note 298 and accompanying text
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nists could simply see the reality of male sexual predation, the circular
distractions of abstract rights arguments might be shunted aside. Real
progress might be made.
The objects in the lengthy analysis of her text were to (1) point out
the constant repetition of that image in her article, and, more important-
ly, (2) to demonstrate the image's use in advancing her arguments. The
image is invariably negative and derogatory. One can experience it as a
wholesale condemnation of male heterosexuality. That, however, is be-
side the point. This lengthy analysis of Statutory Rape shows how a
particular picture of male sexual practices fueled a feminist's discussion
of laws and rights.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This essay was prompted by two recognitions. First, there is no sys-
tematic treatment of how feminist legal theorists depict men in their
writings. In fact, no systematic study exists of how these theorists image
women. They have criticized each other's conceptions of women, but
such commentary has always been part of the debates within feminist
jurisprudence. No one had attempted to stand back and look at the rep-
resentations of men or women across a range of feminist legal theorists.
This was and is a serious deficiency. This essay displays the important
role played by at least one category of such images in feminist jurispru-
dential writing. It shows that these images are central to thematic con-
struction and presentation in feminist jurisprudence. Images of men man-
dated attention because those depictions have been unaddressed, even as
part of feminist legal theory's internal debates.
Second, andric images in feminist jurisprudence also required attention
because of the quality of this imagery. One is struck by the sheer volume
of facile and derogatory definitions and characterizations of men, male,
and masculine, etc., in feminist jurisprudence. Men are rarely differentiat-
ed at all. One is also struck by the indirectness and obtuseness of much
of this imagery. Men are-perhaps of necessity at this time-largely an
inference (interference?) in feminist legal thought. Women receive the
energies directed at completeness and clarity; men, male, or masculine
provide a murky backdrop.
However, this phenomenon of ancillary characterization is important to
examine because women-in part through feminist legal theory-have
entered the previously all-male realm of gender definition and distortion.
Rather than merely providing the possibility of a salutary balance, per-
haps this phenomenon has further cluttered the confusion and height-
ened the crudity of political discourse.
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